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Abstract 
My Master’s Project focuses on local fusion centers and the need for improved information 
sharing practices among law enforcement partners. After the tragic event of September 11th in 
2001, the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice recognized a 
communication gap between law enforcement agencies and a lack of effective information 
sharing efforts. Fusion centers play a significant role in supporting both criminal and terrorist 
investigations due to their ability to act as a conduit between various law enforcement partners. 
Due to their important responsibilities as information sharing hubs that provide valuable analysis 
and dissemination of information and intelligence, it is essential to enhance information practices 
among the centers. My Master’s Project details a strategy that will assist in advancing 
information sharing capabilities among local fusion centers to better detect, investigate, mitigate, 
and avert threats. Specifically, this paper proposes a two-part strategy that entails strengthening 
current partnerships among fusion centers and law enforcement agencies and developing and 
implementing a standardized training program for intelligence analysts. Through improved 
collaborative efforts, fusion centers will be able to better identify, mitigate, and prevent threats to 
ensure public safety and the security of the country. 
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Chapter 1: Strategy 
Introduction 
 Local intelligence fusion centers provide a unique opportunity for enhancing information 
sharing among local, state, and federal authorities. By communicating with local, state, and 
federal authorities, fusion centers are hopefully better able to compile data and identify emerging 
threats. After identifying threat-related information, fusion centers share the information with 
local, state and federal governments, and vice versa. Thus, local, state, and federal authorities are 
better prepared to investigate, and potentially prevent, emerging threats.   
Although a few intelligence fusion centers existed prior to September 11th, the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) helped to 
develop several new fusion centers mainly as a response to the tragic event of September 11th 
(Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2009). Owned and operated by local and state authorities, with 
the support of federal law enforcement, fusion centers were created to implement unique 
facilities to serve the purpose of detecting terrorism-related information and sharing the 
information among local, state, and federal authorities (FBI, 2009). The 9/11 Commission Report 
dealing with the September 11th tragedy detailed a lack of effective communication among all 
agencies, from local law enforcement to federal agencies (National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks, 2004). By not communicating developing information with each other, law enforcement 
and government agencies neglected to identify the emerging threat. Had they communicated 
clearly with each other and shared developing information, they could have detected, and 
possibly prevented, the attack. As a result, fusion centers were created to serve a critical role in 
identifying, investigating, analyzing, and sharing emerging threat-related information in an 
efficient and effective manner.        
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 According to DHS (2017a), there are currently 80 fusion centers in the United States that 
are positioned in various local communities and states to support law enforcement agencies and 
the federal government in identifying threat-related information. Although all local fusion 
centers serve the same purpose of identifying emerging threats and sharing the information with 
the federal government, as well as other levels of government, there is no standard system in 
place for fusion centers to operate. The lack of a standard set of operations regarding information 
sharing makes it difficult for fusion centers to identify, investigate, analyze, and share 
information among local, state, and federal authorities. In order to help improve information 
sharing among fusion centers, there must be effective partnerships among the analysts, local law 
enforcement agencies, and local Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) as well as the creation of a 
standardized training program for intelligence analysts.  
Support for Strategy  
In 2004, the Information Sharing Environment (ISE) was established by the President and 
Congress. Its purpose was to create a trusted partnership among all levels of government, as well 
as the private sector and foreign partners, to detect, prevent, and mitigate the effects of terrorist 
threats against the United States. The partnership established under the ISE enabled the 
appropriate exchange of terrorism-related information among five communities. The 
communities included intelligence, law enforcement, defense, homeland security, and foreign 
affairs. The exchange entailed securing timely and accurate information among the 
aforementioned communities combating terrorism (Department of Justice, 2008).  
As part of the National Strategy for Information Sharing, the federal government 
promoted the use of local fusion centers in order to create an integrated network of facilities that 
fosters information sharing. The federal government helps to sustain the centers through grant 
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funding, training, and technical assistance. Through the ISE, fusion centers enable effective 
communication of locally generated terrorism-related information, such as incident reports and 
suspicious activity, to government agencies, other fusion centers, and local law enforcement. 
Communicating with other localities enables fusion centers to better prepare information at the 
local level and distribute the information to the federal and other related government entities 
(National Security Intelligence, 2007). 
Partnerships. Partnerships encourage collaboration and communication. They encourage 
support between the groups through training, technical assistance, deployment of personnel, 
access to databases and networks, and sharing of various resources (DOJ, 2008). Integrating 
resources between fusion centers and law enforcement from the local context creates a national 
capacity to identify, analyze, and share information in support of efforts to guard the country 
(Department of Homeland Security, 2017b). 
There are several success stories that highlight the importance of partnerships between 
local fusion centers, local law enforcement agencies, and joint terrorism task forces. In 2009, the 
Colorado Information Analysis Center aided an investigation of a local missing woman with 
potential ties to terrorism. After analyzing the investigation report, the analysis center shared the 
information with the local joint terrorism task force which added to an open federal investigation 
on the woman. The analysis center continued to cooperate with the joint terrorism task force on 
the investigation and together they were able to link several other individuals with prior ties to 
terrorism-related crimes to the missing woman. Based upon the collaborative efforts among the 
analysis center and joint terrorism task force, the suspect was apprehended and later convicted 
for providing material support to terrorists (DHS, 2015a).       
 Another success story took place when a law enforcement officer in San Antonio 
11 
INFORMATION SHARING: LOCAL FUSION CENTERS  
 
reported information of a Minnesota-based hate group to their local fusion center in Southwest 
Texas subsequent to making contact with an individual who had ties to the group. After 
reviewing the report and beginning research on the individual and associated hate group, the 
fusion center informed the joint terrorism task force of San Antonio who then referred the 
information to both the Minnesota joint terrorism task force and Minnesota Fusion Center. The 
Minnesota Fusion Center coordinated with local law enforcement in Minnesota to determine if 
there was a viable domestic threat in their jurisdiction. The following day, with the help of the 
Minnesota Police Department Bomb Squad, the FBI executed a search warrant of the suspected 
individual's home, uncovered suspected pipe bombs, Molotov cocktails, and firearms, and 
eventually arrested the individual (DHS, 2015b).  
Training. In addition to partnerships, local fusion centers rely heavily on the capabilities 
of intelligence analysts. The analysts receive training, coordinated by DOJ and DHS, in order to 
acquire skills in identifying, collecting, and analyzing information. While analysts have access to 
training workshops on topics such as risk analysis, privacy rights, and security (DHS, 2017d), it 
is important that analysts in fusion centers receive standardized training to ensure a common set 
of capabilities. Developing a common set of proficiencies among all analysts in fusion centers 
ensures that they receive baseline capabilities for information collection and sharing. It also 
improves communication among analysts in different fusion centers as they will all have learned 
about the same intelligence databases and acquired the same knowledge on analysis and 
dissemination processes.  
In 2010 the DOJ documented common analytic competencies that local, state, and tribal 
intelligence analysts in fusion centers must exhibit. In order to address the necessity of common 
competencies, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) initiated the State, 
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Local, and Tribal (SLT) Training Working Group under the support and purview of DHS. 
Managed by the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) Mission Support Division 
(MSD) Intelligence Training Branch, the group researched and consolidated common analytic 
competencies from previous intelligence analyst and law enforcement training documents that 
would aid fusion center personnel in developing necessary intelligence proficiencies (DOJ, 
2010a).   
The efforts accomplished by the SLT Training Working Group, along with members of 
the Fusion Center Management Group’s Technical Assistance and Training Working Group, 
established a baseline of capabilities for fusion center analysts. The analytical competency areas 
include thinking critically within the intelligence cycle, sharing information and collaborating, 
fusing intelligence and law enforcement tradecraft in a homeland security environment, 
communicating analytic observations and judgements or generating analytic products, and 
turning concepts and principles into action. Further competencies include accessing sources, 
anticipating change, establishing trusted networks of key contributors, using software tools to 
analyze information, producing threat and vulnerability assessments, and evaluating and 
disseminating suspicious activity reports. Because the analysts may handle both criminal and 
national intelligence, they have to possess skills, abilities, and knowledge that aids in detecting 
and investigating various types of intelligence. Their unique environment creates a need for 
analysts to receive training on specific analytic tradecraft skills that includes the handling, 
storage, and maintenance of locally generated information, criminal intelligence and a 
connection to homeland security, and both classified and unclassified intelligence that is 
generated from the Intelligence Community (DOJ, 2010a).      
 Furthermore, intelligence analysts in fusion centers are required to gain knowledge on the 
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intelligence cycle, different types of intelligence, crime-specific training, various tactical, 
operational, and strategic products, and fusion centers’ mission, plans, functions, and procedures. 
Intelligence analysts must also develop knowledge on different topics related to information 
regarding both criminal activity and terrorism-related intelligence. Recognizing the links 
between information related to various criminal activity and terrorism-related intelligence guides 
analysts in identifying activities that are indicative of precursor behaviors, terrorist activities, and 
threats (DOJ, 2010a).   
Strategy  
Strengthening existing partnerships and creating standardized training for intelligence 
analysts will assist in enhancing information gathering and sharing. While these strategies enable 
effective information sharing among local fusion centers, several decisions regarding the 
strategies must still be made.  
Partnerships. In order to establish better communication between the different partners, 
all fusion centers should have a few designated representatives from local law enforcement and 
local joint terrorism task forces staffed in the centers. While still working in the field for ongoing 
investigations, the local law enforcement personnel and terrorism task force agents will work out 
of the fusion centers, side by side the analysts. Having these liaisons work side by side with the 
analysts allows the representatives to keep the analysts constantly updated on threat-related 
information that they discover in the field. It also allows the analysts to inform the 
representatives of developing intelligence so that the representatives can then communicate such 
developments back to their agencies. Additionally, the representatives assigned to work in the 
centers should either have a background in analysis or have previously worked closely with 
intelligence analysts, making it easier to understand technical analysis terms, briefings, and 
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intelligence reports, thus enabling effective communication between them and the analysts. 
 Another important aspect in strengthening partnerships includes having monthly, face to 
face meetings within the local fusion centers. Meetings allow the different partners to speak in 
person and learn about progress and updates on ongoing cases. Most local law enforcement and 
local joint terrorism task forces are uniquely situated to remain physically close to local fusion 
centers (FBI, 2009). These field-based personnel must take advantage of their locations and 
deploy several officers and agents to meet often in the fusion centers. At the meetings analysts 
should provide bulletins, briefings, or intelligence products on new cases or information that they 
discover. Similarly, officers and agents can discuss new leads regarding their cases. The groups 
should also present new suspicious activity reports (SARs) that are considered a top priority. 
Overall, the meetings allow analysts and law enforcement personnel to voice communication 
concerns and remain updated on cases and trends.  
Decisions must also be made regarding security clearances of fusion centers and what 
information, as well as how much, they have access to. Security clearances can include various 
levels such as Secret-level clearances, Top Secret clearances, and Top Secret-Secure 
Compartmentalized Information clearances (Masse, O’Neil, & Rollins, 2007). Information 
classification barriers can often cause delays in processing, investigating, and sharing 
information. Sponsoring security clearances for non-federal government personnel remains an 
issue and reciprocity is often a concern among different levels of law enforcement. Failing to 
recognize another’s clearance may at times hinder the other groups from accessing facilities and 
computer systems (Masse et al., 2007). 
Additionally, security is an important element of fusion centers. Security pertains to 
information, databases, documents, and personnel, and consists of measures such as encryption, 
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authorization, access control, and confidentiality (DOJ, 2006). Because fusion centers collect and 
maintain a vast amount of information, it is important to ensure that the information is stored 
safely and remains safeguarded. When fusion centers partner with local law enforcement and 
local joint terrorism task forces, several personnel become involved in accessing, utilizing, and 
sharing secure information. A breach in security may be an unintended consequence, thus 
potentially compromising several cases. For these reasons, it is vital to ensure that information 
remains secure. Analysts should remain aware of potential emails that might be embedded with 
viruses or malware from hackers. In order to determine how best to protect data, data owners 
must consider both policy and technical concerns (DOJ, 2006).  
Training. In addition to strengthening partnerships, decisions must be made regarding 
the creation and implementation of a standardized training program for intelligence analysts in 
fusion centers. Standardized training for intelligence analysts in fusion centers should be a three-
month program to allot for sufficient time to ensure analysts are proficient in several 
competencies. First and foremost, analysts must be trained in analysis and dissemination 
methods. This includes how to develop reports on crime statistics and trends, write bulletins, 
develop maps for hot spots and patterns, and create intelligence briefings. Next, analysts must 
learn about several databases and computer systems that they will utilize in their daily routines. 
Such databases include Excel, Access, mapping programs, systems for law enforcement contacts 
and incident reports, and more. This also includes procedures regarding the storing and 
maintenance of information as well as capabilities encompassing social media practices. Lastly, 
the analysts must be trained on legal regulations regarding collection methods of information. 
Legal information can include laws and regulations related to the gathering, maintenance, and 
dissemination of information. Because it is important to identify threats without overstepping 
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authority and infringing upon privacy rights, training will require analysts to learn what they are 
legally allowed to collect, as well as the methods required to legally acquire or gain access to 
certain information (DOJ, 2008).  
Discussion 
It is envisioned that the proposed two-part strategy will help to improve information 
sharing among local fusion centers. Part One of the strategy focuses on strengthening and 
developing partnerships between local fusion centers, local law enforcement agencies, and FBI 
joint terrorism task forces. Strengthening these partnerships includes improving methods of 
communication through the staffing of local law enforcement and joint terrorism task force 
personnel in the centers, implementation of monthly meetings, development of security 
clearances, and application of precautionary security measures. Part Two of the strategy 
encompasses creating a standardized training program for intelligence analysts in fusion centers. 
The training must include skills in analysis and dissemination, knowledge on various databases 
and computer systems, and the understanding of legal regulations regarding the collection of 
information.  
Conclusion 
In order to successfully detect, and possibly prevent threats, it is important to improve 
information sharing among local fusion centers. Fusion centers must partner with local law 
enforcement agencies and local FBI joint terrorism task forces to enhance communication and 
combine analytic and investigative skills. Additionally, creating standardized training for fusion 
center intelligence analysts serves to create uniformity of proficiencies among all fusion centers 
as well as enhance the capabilities of the analysts in the centers.      
 When continuing to develop this two-part strategy to enhance information sharing among 
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fusion centers, several questions regarding my strategy may be raised. How will fusion centers, 
local law enforcement, and joint terrorism task forces communicate effectively? How will the 
training for intelligence analysts be funded? And how will managers help to enable and improve 
information sharing? These questions, along with several others, will be further addressed in the 
following chapters. 
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Chapter 2: Management 
 
Introduction 
 
As demonstrated by the tragedy of September 11th, the lack of efficient, consistent 
information sharing among law enforcement and intelligence agencies led to an unprecedented 
event that could have been detected, and possibly prevented, had law enforcement and 
government agencies worked together effectively to recognize warning signs and suspicious 
activity (Nenneman, 2008). Due to the lack of information sharing capabilities, the Department 
of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice focused on enhancing information sharing 
capabilities among fusion centers (Carter & Carter, 2009).  
While information sharing capabilities among fusion centers have advanced, it is 
important to continue to develop partnerships among the analysts, local law enforcement 
agencies, and joint terrorism task forces as well as create and implement standardized training 
for intelligence analysts. In order to accomplish this, it is essential to have leaders who will 
ensure that these strategies are not only developed and implemented in the centers, but that they 
remain in the centers long term. Fusion centers require managers who will enable effective 
communication and information sharing among the centers.   
Management Theory  
 While several management theories exist, the open systems approach to management is 
best suited in enhancing communication within and among local fusion centers, and thus 
implementing effective information sharing. Originally rooted in biology and social sciences, the 
concept of general systems evolved as an organizational theory over time. Recognizing similar 
qualities as other organizational theories, several philosophers and theorists developed general 
systems as a management practice for organizations (Kast & Rosenzweig, 1972). While often 
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studied as a closed system that did not interact with its environment, general systems theory 
evolved to include an open systems perspective in organizations. Open systems theory values 
communication with the organization’s environment as an effective strategy in enhancing work 
productivity (Kast & Rosenzweig, 1972). 
A system is composed of interrelated parts that are interconnected. Systems can either be 
considered closed or open. While closed systems tend to limit the capabilities of organizations, 
an open system promotes working with its environment and outside factors in order to be 
successful. An open system exchanges information, material, or energy with its environment. 
The system remains in a dynamic relationship with its environment by receiving various inputs, 
transforming those inputs in some way, and exporting the outputs thereafter. Such a relationship 
allows the open system to establish a constant flow of information both within the organization 
and outside the organization. The relationship also allows for feedback between the organization 
and its environment to fix any issues that may exist (Kast & Rosenzweig, 1972). Feedback 
entails providing information that reflects the outcomes of acts completed by an individual, 
group, or an organization (Chikere & Nwoka, 2015).      
 Rather than reducing an entity into its parts, open system theory emphasizes the relations 
between the parts. The organization is a system with integrated parts that must coordinate 
together for efficiency and effectiveness. Internally, those who work inside the organization 
perform both their individual and group tasks while externally, several transactions exist between 
the organization and outside institutions. The different parts both within and outside the 
organization collaborate and work together to ensure success overall. In addition, it is important 
for individuals within the organization to be aware of the changes that exist in their environment 
in order to adjust to the changing demands and easily adapt to them. An organization that is not 
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sensitive to its environment will hardly survive. Technology, social, and economic phenomena 
are not static. Rather, they are always changing and organizations must adapt in order to survive 
(Chikere & Nwoka, 2015).   
The open systems approach to management consists of several core components. It 
focuses on cooperation, synergy, and communication in order to exchange necessary information 
with other subsystems or groups (Von Bertalanffy, 1972). In order to collaborate and work 
together with other groups to bring about success, the open systems approach to management 
uses anticipatory control. Anticipatory control entails anticipating errors before they occur. The 
system often relies on institutions outside the organization so that if a possible error or incident 
should occur in one part, the other institutions that the organization converses with can aid in 
mitigating the repercussions. The management theory also takes corrective measures through the 
managerial functions of planning the goals of the organization, staffing individuals to work 
within and outside the organization, leading the process of the transformation of products, 
organizing the final outputs, and controlling the flow of information. Lastly, the theory seeks to 
continuously improve an organization. Rather than remaining stable, even if the system is 
already effective, the open systems approach to management requires constant learning and 
improving to better the organization. Essentially, open systems theory seeks to achieve a 
dynamic equilibrium (Chikere & Nwoka, 2015).  
 In order to determine if the open systems management theory is being practiced in 
modern day organizations, a study was performed on a successful, indigenous organization based 
in Port Harcourt, Nigeria. The organization was chosen as the case study because it demonstrated 
similar core components, such as the structure of subsystems and interrelated parts, of the 
systems theory. The study began with a preliminary survey on the company. The study 
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population was drawn from a list of three departments within the organization. The respondents 
who agreed and consented to applying the systems theory of management were further selected 
for the main study. Thirty questionnaires were administered to the respondents of the three 
departments. They demonstrated an observable relationship that existed among the departments, 
or subsystems, that revealed that the components of the organization were connected together. 
The respondents noted the common flow of communication between the departments and its 
importance to the success of the organization. The respondents also showed that the organization 
functioned by often interacting with similar institutions that complemented its efforts and 
supported the overall success of the organization. Based on the questionnaires and similar traits 
of the systems theory, the study concluded that the open systems theory was in effect at the 
organization based in Port Harcourt. The study also recommended that other modern 
organizations adopt the open systems approach to management to enhance growth and 
profitability (Chikere & Nwoka, 2015). 
In addition to the open systems approach to management, the team leadership model is 
another valuable management theory in building successful information sharing capabilities 
among local fusion centers. While there have been several different developments of the team 
leadership theory, Susan Kogler Hill proposed a team leaderships model that specifically focuses 
on the ability of the leader to monitor team work and ensure team effectiveness by promoting 
strong communication and problem solving skills (Northouse, 2012).  
Hill’s team leadership model is used to aid leaders who often manage groups with similar 
capabilities and tasks. It helps leaders determine team issues and concerns, as well as several 
alternatives to resolve the issues, while remaining cognizant of the team’s capabilities, resources, 
and external challenges and opportunities. The model allows leaders to be able to work with their 
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teams within the organization as well as externally, with other groups, outside the organization. 
Such leaders are able to encourage networking, support, and information sharing with their 
external environment. They are also able to balance both the internal and external demands 
placed on their teams as well as to know when to intervene in one or both (Northouse, 2013).  
Teams are often complex, dynamic systems that exist in greater systemic contexts of 
cultures, people, structures, and technologies. As a result, leaders must create synergy within the 
team and recognize the value in focusing on tasks and people to develop successful team 
building skills. Task‐focused behaviors include work apportionment, goal setting, process 
structuring, adapting to changes, information seeking, and feedback. Empirical studies often 
demonstrate that task‐focused behaviors relate directly to team effectiveness. Interpersonal skills 
also contribute greatly to team effectiveness. People-focused behaviors include facilitating team 
member participation in the group, developing a positive climate, harmonizing problems, setting 
standards of behavior, and encouraging friendly and supportive behavior. Team leaders must also 
develop a strong sense of trust among all members and groups to enable constructive feedback 
and team resiliency (Gerras & Clark, 2011). Such leaders require an abundance of trust, 
credibility, and competency in order to support their teams (Nenneman, 2008). These qualities 
combined enable the team leadership model to successfully acquire team effectiveness as well as 
overall work productivity and success in the organization. 
The team leadership model focuses on three broad responsibilities for the leaders to 
accomplish. First, leaders must enforce efficient productivity and improve the team’s ability in 
accomplishing tasks. This includes focusing on desired goals and outcomes as well as creating 
certain standards for individual and team performances to be successful in reaching the goals. 
Second, they must improve the team members’ interpersonal skills and intra-team relationships. 
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In order to accomplish this, team leaders support collaboration among team members, coach 
them to help improve social skills, and expand team commitment. Third, team leaders must be 
aware of developing team building skills within the organization as well as contributing to 
building similar skills outside the organization. External leadership action requires keeping the 
team connected to its external environment. Keeping the team connected to its environment 
involves creating strong alliances with outside sources to gain access to information regularly 
(Northouse, 2013).            
Application of Theory to Strategy 
 The open systems approach to management and the team leadership model provide 
valuable practices that assist in strengthening partnerships with outside agencies and enforcing 
training for analysts to support information sharing among fusion centers. By establishing 
constant communication, networking, and team work with outside agencies, the aforementioned 
management theories provide fusion centers with the necessary abilities to regularly exchange 
information with their partners. Similarly, supporting enhancement of capabilities and team 
productivity for those who share similar tasks and responsibilities supports the need for training 
for all fusion center analysts.  
Challenges. While implementing these strategies to improve information sharing, 
managers may experience some challenges. Local fusion centers rely heavily on partnerships as 
part of their system, yet analysts and law enforcement personnel develop and utilize different 
reports such as briefings, maps, and strategic and tactical products. Additionally, a lack of trusted 
partnerships and incompatible computer systems and software are often obstacles that can 
negatively impact the ability to share intelligence efficiently (DOJ, 2006).   
 Although managers oversee and work with different groups that often perform different 
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duties, it is their responsibility to create a level of communication that each can understand. 
Fusion center managers must collaborate with managers from local law enforcement and joint 
terrorism task forces to assign a few members of these agencies to be staffed within the fusion 
centers. Staffing the centers with these law enforcement liaisons supports the centers’ 
productivity in communicating and sharing information to better develop intelligence that aids in 
ongoing efforts to prevent threats.         
  Additionally, because analysts and law enforcement personal have different access levels 
and security clearances, having the representatives in the centers allows these personnel to 
collaborate with one another in gathering information more efficiently and effectively. If certain 
data is needed regarding imminent threats that analysts may not have access to, they can 
collaborate with their law enforcement liaisons to access such information. Similarly, the law 
enforcement representatives can rely on the analysts for access to various databases.  
Finally, face to face meetings allow the groups to discuss new information, leads, or 
cases in detail. Held at the fusion centers, each meeting must consist of a number of analysts, 
officers, agents, and managers. At the meetings the analysts must present bulletins or briefings 
on updated information they acquire on possible threats for the officers and agents to follow up 
on. Analysts should also present intelligence products they create for ongoing investigations. 
Officers and agents should present new leads or cases they discover in the field in order for 
analysts to gather information on possible persons of interest or suspects. Either group may also 
present new suspicious activity reports that are a priority. Ultimately, meetings give each group 
the opportunity to discuss any communication concerns, updates on emerging threats, and 
improved methods and techniques to disrupt them. They also help to encourage trust among the 
partners.            
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 In addition to partnerships, fusion centers rely heavily on the skills of intelligence 
analysts and their ability to coordinate with each other. There is no standard training system, 
however, for all analysts in fusion centers to undergo. A lack of unified standards and policies 
can negatively impact analysts’ ability to effectively share information and intelligence (DOJ, 
2006). Similarly, if intelligence analysts are not prepared to collect, analyze, and disseminate 
information, it could adversely impact the quality of intelligence produced and its timely 
dissemination, ultimately negatively affecting major criminal or terrorism-related cases. 
Standardized training prepares analysts in gathering and collecting information to avoid such 
negative consequences (Nenneman, 2008).  
Implementing standardized training for intelligence analysts may be a challenge in that it 
requires determining what should be included in the training. Local fusion centers are built on 
the capacity of the analysts being able to effectively work together with each other as well as 
field-based law enforcement personnel (Northouse, 2013). When individual intelligence analysts 
fail to perform their tasks, the entire group of analysts can be negatively affected (Chikere & 
Nwoka, 2015). When the entire group fails to effectively accomplish their tasks, there is not 
enough production of information to share with the other local groups aiding the investigations. 
As a result, information is not properly gathered, cases are not built, and sharing with federal 
agencies becomes impossible when there is nothing substantial to share.    
Team work and collaboration is a vital element of fusion centers. By creating 
standardized training, managers are able to foster similar skills, traits, and characteristics of 
intelligence analysts. A common set of competencies supports better communication, 
collaboration, and interoperability among the analysts, thus creating effective team work and 
productivity (DOJ, 2010a). Analysts must acquire skills in analysis and dissemination. They 
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must gain technical skills and knowledge regarding computer systems and databases. 
Additionally, they must learn the legal guidelines regarding collection of information and how to 
store and maintain intelligence. By acquiring the same skills and gaining access to the same 
systems, analysts are able to easily work with each other and exchange information. 
 In order to maintain growth of the analysts during and after the training, feedback should 
be constantly present in and among fusion centers. Feedback allows analysts within different 
centers to voice concerns, as well as give positive feedback, for continuous growth and 
development. Managers ensure that feedback remains an integral component for the centers by 
helping analysts to assess their performances monthly, adapt to changes as necessary, and 
continue to develop by discussing new ideas to quickly and efficiently prevent viable threats 
(Morgeson, DeRue, & Karam, 2010). 
Lastly, managers must encourage trust among the analysts in the local fusion centers 
(Morgeson et al., 2010). Building trust helps managers to allow individual analysts to perform 
their tasks on their own while also knowing when it is necessary to intervene among them. Trust 
also provides the analysts the ability to easily go to their managers should there be internal, as 
well as external, problems that could potentially hinder the overall group of analysts and their 
production in detecting and analyzing threats (Northouse, 2013).  
Conclusion  
While some challenges may arise when implementing strategies to enhance partnerships 
among fusion centers and develop standardized training for analysts, managers can help to 
implement such plans through effective communication. In order to help improve information 
sharing among local fusion centers, the open systems approach to management and the team 
leadership model will guide managers in overcoming challenges. Through such practices, 
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information sharing among fusion centers will be improved, leading to better detection, as well 
as prevention, of threats to the country.         
 In Chapter 3, a strategic plan and budget to implement and execute measures for 
improving information sharing among fusion centers will be proposed. It will address budget 
issues that may arise when implementing partnerships and intelligence training to enhance 
information sharing capabilities among local fusion centers.  
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Chapter 3: Strategic Planning and Budgeting 
Introduction 
Improving fusion centers’ abilities to share information will allow the centers to continue 
to grow in their capacities to detect and prevent threats. Updating partnerships with local law 
enforcement and local FBI joint terrorism task forces and developing a standardized training 
program for intelligence analysts will help to improve information sharing. In order to 
successfully place this strategy into practice to enhance information sharing among fusion 
centers, a strategic plan must be developed.    
Strategic Planning 
When addressing strategy, several components must be considered. Such components 
include fusion centers’ purpose, mandates, stakeholders, vision statement, mission statement, 
internal & external factors, strategic issues, performance goals, performance indicators, and their 
budget and resources. These components make up the detailed strategic plan that will assist in 
enhancing information sharing among fusion centers. 
Mandates. Mandates include a description of what an organization has to accomplish 
based on the services and programs it offers. Mandates are orders or policies that the 
organization seeks to strive for and carry out. They can be expressed both informally or formally 
through various methods such as contracts, group expectations, partnership agreements, or 
policies (Community Literacy of Ontario, 2013). For example, in 2008 the Baseline Capabilities 
for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers was created to supplement Fusion Center 
Guidelines in order to: 1) establish baseline operation standards for fusion centers and 2) outline 
the necessary capabilities for fusion centers (DHS, 2017a). These documents are formal 
mandates of fusion centers.         
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 The main expectation of fusion centers is to keep Americans safe and the country secure 
by detecting threats before they can become viable. Fusion centers can deliver this expectation 
by improving information sharing. Each partner involved in the information sharing process 
plays a vital role. Local law enforcement, local joint terrorism task forces, and analysts must 
accomplish their individual tasks and then share information they develop with each other to 
build cases and discover emerging threats. Similarly, the training program for fusion center 
intelligence analysts provides analysts with the skills necessary to accomplish their individual 
tasks as well as collaborate with groups and share information more seamlessly.   
Stakeholders. Stakeholders are individuals involved in an organization who have either 
an interest, stake, or claim in the organization, in the activities it partakes in, or how well it 
performs. Stakeholders are categorized into two groups: inside stakeholders and outside 
stakeholders. Inside stakeholders comprise those who are closest to the organization and have the 
most direct claim on the organization’s resources. Outside stakeholders include those who 
neither own the organization nor are employed by it. Rather, outside stakeholders are customers, 
suppliers, the government, unions, local communities, and/or the public who may still have a 
general interest in the organization or its activities (Jones, 1994).      
 Local fusion centers collaborate with several partners including local, state, tribal, 
territorial, federal, and private sector partners. It is their connection with each of these partners 
that makes fusion centers unique in conducting analysis, facilitating information sharing, and 
assisting law enforcement and homeland security professionals in investigating and responding 
to threats (DHS, 2017a).          
 For my particular strategy to improve information sharing methods, intelligence analysts, 
local law enforcement officers, and FBI joint terrorism task force agents are the inside 
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stakeholders. The analysts gather, analyze, disseminate, and share threat-related information. 
They create several intelligence products, including intelligence briefings and threat assessments, 
and perform other tasks including charting, graphing, and mapping (DOJ, 2006). Local law 
enforcement conduct investigations, follow up on leads, and provide situational awareness of 
their localities and communities for both the analysts and homeland security partners (DHS, 
2017a). This contributes greatly to both the safety of local communities as well as national 
security. Lastly, local joint terrorism task forces provide expertise on terrorism-related cases. 
Although managed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the task forces consist of federal, 
state, local, tribunal, and territorial law enforcement partners. Together they are integrated task 
forces that combat terrorism on both a national and international scale. As a result of their skills 
and capabilities, their partnership with fusion centers is vital to the success of the centers. They 
assist in conducting counter-terrorism investigations while providing information for intelligence 
products and assessments (DHS, 2016).       
 In addition to inside stakeholders, the main outside stakeholders involved in fusion 
centers are local communities and the general public. Citizens of the United States have an 
interest in the activities of fusion centers as the centers seek to keep the country secure and 
citizens safe from harm. Collaborating with various local law enforcement officials and 
homeland security partners provides for the safety of the public from criminal and terrorist 
activity. The general public expects the centers and their law enforcement partners to identify 
and investigate threats to keep them, and their country, safe.      
 Vision statement. Vision statements address where an organization is headed in future 
years and what it seeks to accomplish over time. They should be inspirational whereby the 
stakeholders of the organization will want to strive for the vision and accomplish the goals 
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involved (Olsen, 2008). Through information sharing with various law enforcement partners, 
fusion centers strive to identify, investigate, and prevent serious threats. While fusion centers 
continue to develop new and efficient ways to share information, they are built on the foundation 
of detecting threats early and strive to prevent them and protect citizens. They facilitate unique 
information sharing capabilities to promptly detect all serious threats, and thus prevent such 
threats and secure Americans’ safety (DHS, 2017a).      
 Mission statement. Mission statements explain what the organization does, who it may 
do it for, and the purpose of the organization (Johnson, 2010). Fusion centers perform several 
tasks. They serve as the primary conduit among several partners to continuously exchange 
information pertaining to investigations. Fusion centers analyze and disseminate threat-related 
information. Their localities allow them to provide a unique perspective on threats, thus 
contributing to the national threat picture. They also work with the Department of Homeland 
Security’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis to facilitate the intelligence cycle at the local level 
and foster information sharing with stakeholders at the federal level (DHS, 2017d). Based on 
such activities, local fusion centers exist to utilize their skills, expertise, and resources in analysis 
to share information with law enforcement and maximize their ability to identify, collect, 
investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity and ensure public safety (DHS, 2017a). 
 Internal and external situational analysis. In order to ensure that fusion centers are 
successful, it is essential to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the organization. A SWOT 
analysis, consisting of identifying strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats, must be 
performed to carefully analyze components of fusion centers. The SWOT analysis creates a view 
of the current state of the organization to aid in determining how best to build its future. The 
strengths and weaknesses are considered through the internal factors of fusion centers whereby 
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they have a direct impact on the organization. The opportunities and threats are addressed 
through external factors, or the environment, of the centers (Olsen, 2013).    
 The main strengths of fusion centers include the resources, capabilities, and skills they 
possess. Federal agencies provide numerous resources, including technical support and access to 
various databases, to fusion centers to support their efforts in detecting threats. Some of the 
systems and network resources include the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s LEO Program, 
International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), Financial Crimes Enforcement 
Network (FinCEN), High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA), and several others (DOJ, 
2006). Furthermore, the Department of Homeland Security, along with several other federal 
partners, provides additional resources through information systems access, training, and 
guidance (DHS, 2017d).          
 In addition to resources, fusion centers possess enhanced capabilities. They are equipped 
to carefully recognize various indicators and warnings. They process and collate information, as 
well as analyze and disseminate it, to create intelligence products. They also generate risk 
assessments to identify and prioritize vulnerabilities, threats, and consequences at regular 
intervals (DOJ, 2008). Their ability to recognize local threats not only impacts local communities 
but serves to contribute to a greater national security picture. The centers may potentially 
discover vulnerabilities at the local level that may be related to a much larger plot and threat at 
the national level (DHS, 2017d).         
 While fusion centers possess many strengths, one weakness that exists within local fusion 
centers is difficulty in constantly ensuring effective teamwork amongst analysts. Fusion centers 
must exhibit strong information sharing abilities, yet it can be difficult to accomplish such goals 
when analysts often remain isolated at their desks and on their computers, refraining from 
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collaborating with one another. Fusion centers must foster continuous collaboration among the 
analysts as working together helps to make a connection between cases or potential suspects 
quicker, and thus aid in discovering emerging threats sooner.    
 In addition to strengths and weaknesses, it is important to evaluate external factors of 
opportunities and threats that may impact fusion centers. An opportunity that stems from the 
environment of fusion centers involves the collaborative efforts of local law enforcement and 
federal agencies who provide information to the analysts while working in the field. The goals of 
fusion centers could not be accomplished without the input from these partners as they contribute 
greatly to the centers through their unique local perspective and skills. Local officers are familiar 
with their communities, including the people within them (DHS, 2017a). This allows them to 
also build a partnership with the private sector and share their resources in investigations. In 
addition, local joint terrorism task force agents’ extensive training, experience, and expertise in 
terrorism-related cases aid the centers in better identifying suspicious activity that may lead to 
serious, viable threats (DHS, 2016).        
 A threat, or challenge, that often emanates from the environment of a fusion center is the 
lack of effective communication. Fusion centers rely heavily on outside partners to work closely 
with the analysts in gathering and sharing information to detect threats. It is difficult, however, to 
constantly and consistently communicate with each partner when they have their own 
responsibilities. In order to effectively collaborate with outside personnel, the centers need to be 
able to continuously communicate with them. If something is not understood, the partners must 
be able to verbalize their concerns and work to correct the issue.   
 Strategic issues. Strategic issues often emanate from unresolved questions within the 
organization that require clarification (Ambler, 2017). Addressing these issues and determining 
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why they are a challenge allows the organization to then determine how best to fix them. While 
there are several methods in analyzing an organization and determining how to identify its 
strategic issues, the oval mapping approach is best in identifying the strategic issues of a fusion 
center. The oval mapping approach consists of utilizing diagrams to better understand concerns 
that may arise throughout the work production of an organization. It encourages using word and 
arrow diagrams that include statements on the actions of the organization, how such actions are 
performed, and the cause and effect relationship among them (Bryson, 2004).   
 Based upon the number of partners involved in fusion centers and various duties, tasks, 
and responsibilities that each has, the oval mapping approach is more than fitting for analyzing 
strategic issues of fusion centers. The diagram can exhibit how the system of a fusion center 
functions and how each group collaborates with one another. It can also demonstrate how each 
partner exchanges information. Connecting such dots visually will help fusion centers determine 
where on the diagrams there may be a concern, especially regarding information sharing 
practices.             
 When visualizing the interaction between local law enforcement personnel, joint 
terrorism task force agents, and intelligence analysts, the main strategic issues identified are 
communication concerns. For example, differences in security clearances can make it difficult 
for the partners to access and share certain information. Strategic issues also emanate from inside 
the centers as intelligence analysts may find difficulty in consistently interacting with one 
another and fostering teamwork and collaboration. Overcoming these strategic issues of 
communication and teamwork is a difficult task but one that is necessary for the centers to 
successfully detect and prevent threats.      
 Performance goals. Goals in a local fusion center must be specific, measurable, 
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attainable, responsible, and time specific (Torres, 2014). First and foremost, in order to 
strengthen and update partnerships, it is vital to acquire a select group of representatives from 
local law enforcement and local joint terrorism task forces that will act as liaisons in the centers. 
As a result, it is necessary to develop a liaison selection process. Such a goal includes acquiring, 
in approximately one year, roughly 10 representatives from local law enforcement and local joint 
terrorism task force personnel. Depending on the size of the locality and fusion center, more 
representatives may be acquired, but there should be no more than 25. The representatives are 
meant to be a small, select groups of local law enforcement and local joint terrorism task force 
personnel that can work closely with the analysts to collect and share intelligence.  
While all local law enforcement and local joint terrorism task force personnel are 
welcome to apply, there are several required qualities and skills. The applicant must have either a 
background in analysis or have previously worked closely with intelligence analysts. They must 
demonstrate exceptional interpersonal and leadership skills. They must also be able to multitask. 
These skills and qualities will aid greatly in the goals to ease communication between local law 
enforcement, homeland security partners, and analysts. These representatives are held to a higher 
standard because they will have numerous responsibilities that require effective information 
sharing and the ability to act as intermediaries between their groups and the analysts. Lieutenants 
and sergeants from law enforcement agencies, supervisors from the terrorism task forces, and 
directors of fusion centers will collaborate together to determine who will be selected to act as 
liaisons in the centers.          
 Similar to partnerships, the goals for the standardized training program for fusion center 
analysts must also be specific, measurable, attainable, responsible, and time specific. Creating 
and implementing the standardized training program for intelligence analysts in fusion centers 
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should be completed in approximately two years as it will take time to develop a detailed 
program, create a selection process, and apply the program to all fusion centers. Individuals 
applying to fusion centers must exhibit skills and capabilities in either analysis or information 
technology or have prior experience in such areas. Once hired as analysts, they will undergo the 
standardized training.  
The training program will be three months and consist of three core components. First, 
the analysts will acquire analysis and dissemination skills, learn how to write intelligence 
briefings, create graphs and maps, and develop reports that analysts produce daily. Second, they 
will develop technological skills that include learning about computer systems and databases. 
This involves storing and maintenance of data. The trainees will also learn how to navigate social 
media sites efficiently. Lastly, they will study legal regulations in regards to what information 
they can and cannot collect in the centers. This will ensure information is gathered lawfully.  
Performance indicator. In order to ensure that the strategies of fusion centers are 
successful in detecting and preventing threats, the outcomes of the plan must be measured. There 
should be several supervisory analysts within the fusion centers who establish performance 
metrics to determine if the strategies and actions performed in the centers are effective. They 
must gather previous cases where threats were detected and prevented as a result of the work 
produced by the centers. They can then analyze the cases, decipher how long it took to first 
detect the threat, how long it took to investigate, as well as determine if the threat became viable, 
and understand the methods that were used to avert the threat. They also have to analyze the 
efforts of each partner, including analysts, local law enforcement personnel, and local FBI joint 
terrorism task force agents, to determine what could have been done differently to identify the 
threat sooner. Studying past cases allows these analysts to decipher what the issues were, if there 
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were any, so that they can be resolved.      
 Budget and resources. While strategies are vital in improving information sharing, it 
would be impossible to implement such plans without the necessary resources and budget. Many 
resources for the partnerships between local law enforcement, local joint terrorism task forces, 
and analysts currently exist. They each have resources such as databases, various personnel, and 
computer systems (DHS, 2018d). The additional resources that are necessary, however, primarily 
include work stations and computers in the fusion centers for the liaisons.   
 For the second part of my strategy in developing standardized training for analysts in 
fusion centers, several resources are necessary. It is essential to allocate for the space to train the 
individuals for the program as well as obtain resources for core components of the training. This 
includes equipment such as smart boards to present lessons, manuals on intelligence and 
analysis, computers for the analysts to develop technical skills and navigate various databases, 
and legal texts and guidelines regarding the gathering and collection of information.  
 In order to fund these strategies and resources, fusion centers must gain help from the 
federal government. Currently, the federal government provides both resources and funding to 
fusion centers to aid in their activities and goals (DHS, 2018c). Specifically, the Department of 
Homeland Security's Office of Intelligence and Analysis, the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, and the Department of Justice provide significant resources, training, and services to 
fusion centers. Federal agencies also assist in providing grants for various programs and 
initiatives for the success of fusion centers and their partners (DHS, 2018d). As a result, local 
fusion centers should look towards the federal government to provide significant assistance in 
their resources and funding to strengthen partnerships and implement standardized training. 
Providing such resources and funding, including grants, allows the strategies to improve 
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information sharing. In turn, the centers can continue to grow and advance in their efforts to 
effectively share information and better detect and prevent threats. 
Effective Communication  
 Overall, the key to building a successful strategic plan in enhancing information sharing 
among local fusion centers is establishing effective communication among analysts, law 
enforcement personnel, and homeland security partners. While communication is a vital 
component of law enforcement efforts in general, it is especially important to the centers and 
their ability to effectively integrate and exchange information. Because the centers act as hubs 
that provide for the receipt, gathering, and distribution of information and intelligence, effective 
means of communication is essential (DHS, 2017d). 
Conclusion  
 Creating and implementing a strategic proposal requires efficient planning. Such 
planning includes being able to effectively analyze fusion centers, determine current issues, and 
how best to resolve them. Detailing my two-part strategy of updating partnerships between local 
law enforcement, local FBI joint terrorism task forces, and analysts as well as creating and 
implementing standardized training for fusion center analysts is necessary in order to develop 
and execute such plans. Through my proposal, fusion centers will be able to enhance information 
sharing capabilities and ultimately, better detect and disrupt threats to the country. 
 Chapter 4 involves the United States Constitution and the protections it guarantees to 
citizens. It will also address any concerns or issues that may emanate from local fusion centers 
and their activities in relation to the fundamental rights granted in the United States Constitution. 
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Chapter 4: U.S. Constitution and Ethical Issues 
Introduction  
By conducting analysis and facilitating information sharing, fusion centers assist law 
enforcement partners and homeland security personnel in averting, protecting against, and 
responding to both crime and terrorism (DHS, 2017c). While fusion centers serve to detect and 
prevent threats, it is also important to ensure that in the process, they abide by the rights of those 
they seek to protect. The Constitution of the United States guarantees citizens several rights 
(U.S. Const.). While identifying and preventing threats through information sharing practices, 
fusion centers must be guided by the Constitution and abide by the rights of citizens.    
U.S. Constitution 
The Constitution of the United States is a living document that represents independence 
and nationhood of the United States of America. Within the Constitution, the Bill of Rights 
makes up the first ten amendments that overall limit governmental power and ensure protection 
of Americans’ individual liberties (U.S. Const.).       
 The First Amendment ensures freedom of speech, religion, press, the right to peacefully 
assemble, and petition the government for a redress of grievances (U.S. Const. amend. I). The 
Second Amendment ensures the right of a well-regulated militia and the right of the people to 
keep and bear arms (U.S. Const. amend. II). The Third Amendment explains that no soldier 
shall, in a time of peace or war, be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner of 
the home (U.S. Const. amend. III). The Fourth Amendment guarantees against unreasonable 
searches and seizures. More specifically, it is the right of the people to be secure in their houses, 
persons, effects, and papers against unreasonable searches and seizures. If warrants are obtained 
they must be based upon probable cause and must clearly describe the place to be searched as 
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well as the persons or things to be seized (U.S. Const. amend. IV). The Fifth Amendment 
addresses self-incrimination where no person can be held to answer for crimes unless on an 
indictment or presentment of a grand jury. It also ensures that no person can be tried twice for 
the same crime and that due process protects a person from being deprived of life, liberty, and 
property (U.S. Const. amend. V). The Sixth Amendment guarantees a speedy, fair, and public 
trial in criminal cases. Every person is entitled to an impartial jury, counsel for their defense, the 
right to be informed of the accusations against them, and the right to be confronted with the 
witness(s) against them (U.S. Const. amend. VI). The Seventh Amendment ensures the right to 
trial by jury in civil cases whereby the facts presented to them can never be reexamined in any 
other court in the United States (U.S. Const. amend. VII). The Eighth Amendment protects 
against cruel and unusual punishment. It also protects against excessive bail and fines (U.S. 
Const. amend. VIII). The Ninth Amendment addresses the enumerated powers and rights in the 
Constitution whereby such rights cannot be construed to deny others retained by the people (U.S. 
Const. amend. IX). Lastly, the Tenth Amendment explains that the powers that are not delegated 
to the United States by the Constitution and that are not prohibited by it to the states are then 
given to states, or the people (U.S. Const. amend. X). Additionally, extending liberties to the Bill 
of Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment includes equal protection of the law and ensures that 
individuals are not deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process (U.S. Const. amend. 
XIV). 
Excluding permissible infringements that apply to many Constitutional rights, it is 
important to abide by the rights provided in the United States Constitution as they are there to 
protect individual liberties. While there should be efficient law enforcement efforts to ensure 
constant protection of the people, it is also vital that in the process of developing such efforts, 
41 
INFORMATION SHARING: LOCAL FUSION CENTERS  
 
Constitutional rights are not violated. Namely, with information gathering and sharing methods 
practiced by local fusion centers, it is important to ensure that the rights of the people are not 
being denied in the process. If they are, the information gathering and sharing methods must be 
amended to ensure Constitutional rights are protected. 
Data collection. Fusion centers gather and share information with law enforcement 
partners (DHS, 2017d). When law enforcement agencies collect information on people, however, 
there can be several concerns including Constitutional rights of equal protection, freedom of 
expression, and privacy. Given the amount of data that local fusion centers gather such concerns 
are magnified. The amount of information collected by fusion centers raises concerns that 
information may be accessed or stored improperly in databases and that individuals may 
potentially be subjected to unwarranted scrutiny based on either innocuous activities or their 
religious or political beliefs or racial status (The Constitution Project, 2012). Additionally, as the 
centers continue to expand their information collection abilities, there is the potential for 
accountability and oversight evasion, data breaches regarding the involvement of the private 
sector, and manipulation of data collection and mining processes that may threaten privacy and 
negatively impact civil liberties (American Civil Liberties Union, 2019).      
Specifically, the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution protects individuals from 
unreasonable searches and allows individuals to be secure in their persons and houses. Warrants 
must also be obtained by probable cause (U.S. Const. amend. IV). Suspicious activity reporting 
is a concept in which law enforcement personnel and homeland security leaders identify and 
share information that is indicative of preoperational planning regarding criminal activity or 
terrorism. Fusion centers share these reports with FBI joint terrorism task forces (Nationwide 
SAR Initiative, n.d.). Such reports, however, may inadvertently infringe upon individual’s rights 
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protected by the Fourth Amendment. Data collection regarding suspicious activity observed by 
law enforcement officials could potentially result in the creation of vast databases of information 
compiled on individuals without reasonable suspicion that such individuals are actually linked to 
criminal activity or terrorism (The Constitution Project, 2012). 
In addition to the Fourth Amendment, the First Amendment regarding freedom of speech, 
religion, and press may be impacted by fusion centers. The amendment guarantees that 
individuals can express themselves freely and as they choose, such as through their religious and 
political beliefs. A main concern with fusion centers in relation to the rights provided in the First, 
as well as the Fourteenth, Amendment of the Constitution is the potential of profiling. Efforts 
taken by fusion centers to monitor, surveil, and share information about individuals may 
implicate fundamental Constitutional rights of freedom of speech and religion, as well as 
freedom of association and equal protection. Targeting individuals for suspicion based on 
characteristics such as political beliefs, religion, or race violates the freedoms granted to 
individuals in the U.S. Constitution (The Constitution Project, 2012).  
While not explicitly stated, another right that has been inferred and recognized from the 
Constitution is the right to privacy. The right to privacy is interpreted in several of the first ten 
amendments of the United States Constitution (Right to Privacy, 2017). While fusion centers 
serve the purpose of analyzing, disseminating, and sharing threat-related information, some 
individuals are concerned that fusion centers can infringe upon privacy rights (DHS, 2017d). As 
technology continues to advance, terrorists become smarter and threats become more likely. As a 
response, it becomes important for the United States to develop new methods to ensure that 
Americans are safe and that threats do not become viable. With these new approaches and 
developments, however, privacy concerns can arise as the balance between maintaining security 
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of the country and ensuring the right to privacy can be difficult to accomplish.   
 Particularly, individuals question if fusion centers are lawfully gathering and collecting 
information when seeking to detect threats. These concerns emanate due to questions concerning 
exactly what information fusion centers are privy to. In order to detect threats, analysts perform 
several activities, some of which include researching individuals, as well as their backgrounds, 
that may be considered a threat or may be involved in criminal or terrorist activities. For 
example, a main tool utilized by fusion centers to identify and share threats includes the SAR 
Initiative, or Suspicious Activity Reporting. This suspicious activity reporting initiative is used 
by the centers to form a national network for gathering and sharing local law enforcement reports 
that include suspicious and potentially terrorism-related activity. As a result, there is a possibility 
that the program may infringe upon Constitutional rights of privacy based on the loose definition 
of suspicious activity, exactly what information is included in the initiative, and how such 
information is obtained (The Constitution Project, 2012). 
Solution. While some citizens remain wary that fusion centers can potentially violate 
several rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution, measures must be taken to ensure 
that fusion centers protect individuals while refraining from violating inalienable rights. This 
includes lawfully gathering information that pertains to serious, potential threats. It is also 
important to ensure that citizens trust and support fusion centers to keep them safe and keep the 
country secure. Although currently there is federal guidance to protect against activities such as 
performing unreasonable searches, profiling, and invading privacy when collecting and sharing 
data, it is imperative to include more guidance, training, and oversight for fusion center activities 
(The Constitution Project, 2012).         
 In order to overcome challenges involving civil liberties, Part-Two of my strategy 
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involves the creation and implementation of standardized training for analysts. By teaching legal 
regulations as a core component of the training program, intelligence analysts will know how to 
lawfully gather and store information from the very beginning of their careers. Teaching legal 
regulations as a core component of the program also assists in information sharing efforts with 
local law enforcement and local joint terrorism task forces. Instead of receiving information 
gathered unlawfully, law enforcement personnel will receive information that can be used to 
build investigations, prosecute offenders, and prevent threats. 
Currently, all fusion centers do not operate in the same manner. Since no two fusion 
centers are alike regarding information collection regulations and procedures, it is difficult to 
make sure that all are following the law and not abusing their powers (American Civil Liberties 
Union, 2019). Standardized training, however, ensures uniformity among all fusion centers in 
regard to guidelines and practices, helping to ensure that all centers are collecting and gathering 
data lawfully, and thus protecting individuals' Constitutional rights.  
Legislation 
Enacted by Congress as a response to September 11th, the Patriot Act was created to 
enforce new tools and methods to detect and prevent terrorism. In order to improve counter-
terrorism efforts, the legislation permits law enforcement personnel to utilize surveillance against 
more crimes of terror, federal agents to follow sophisticated and advanced terrorists trained to 
evade detection, law enforcement to conduct investigations without tipping off terrorists, and 
federal agents to ask a court for an order to obtain business records in cases of national security 
involving terrorism (DOJ, n.d.c).         
 In addition, the Patriot Act facilitates information sharing, cooperation, and collaboration 
among various government agencies in order to better “connect the dots” (DOJ, n.d.c, p. 2). The 
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act removed major legal barriers that restrict law enforcement officials, intelligence analysts, and 
national defense communities from coordinating their efforts in protecting the American people 
and ensuring national security (DOJ, n.d.c). 
The Patriot Act also updated the law to reflect new threats and technologies. Under this 
component of the act, law enforcement officials are granted the ability to obtain a search warrant 
anywhere a terrorist-related activity takes place and victims of computer hacking are allowed to 
request assistance from law enforcement in monitoring the “trespassers” (DOJ, n.d.c, p. 2) on 
their computers. Lastly, the act increased the penalties for those who commit acts of terror. This 
includes prohibiting the harboring of terrorists, enhancing the maximum penalties for different 
crimes that are likely to be committed by terrorists, enhancing several conspiracy penalties, 
punishing terrorist attacks on mass transit systems, punishing bioterrorists, and eliminating the 
statutes of limitations for certain terrorist crimes as well as lengthening them for others (DOJ, 
n.d.c).  
These tools and activities are beneficial to fusion centers as they provide them with better 
resources and abilities to identify and investigate terrorism-related threats. Similar to the 
Information Sharing Environment developed by the Department of Homeland Security to 
support the sharing of information between law enforcement, intelligence agencies, and the 
private sector, the Patriot Act enforces information sharing to better identify acts of terrorism 
before they occur (Hodai, 2013).  
Conclusion 
While the goal of local fusion centers is to protect citizens and keep the country secure, it 
is imperative that individuals’ Constitutional rights are protected. As technology advances and 
threats become more serious, the balance between ensuring security and guaranteeing 
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Constitutional rights becomes difficult to maintain. Nonetheless, America is a country founded 
on the principals and rights provided in the United States Constitution. When developing 
strategies to ensure safety for the people and security for the country, measures must be taken to 
ensure that Constitutional rights are not violated. By keeping Constitutional rights in mind while 
developing information gathering and sharing practices, fusion centers can accomplish their 
goals in providing safety for the public while still protecting individuals’ fundamental rights.  
 In Chapter 5, policy analysis of fusion centers will be discussed. It will identify the 
problems of the centers so that they can be addressed and resolved through policy formulation, 
policy adoption, policy implementation, and policy evaluation.  
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Chapter 5: Policy Analysis and Evaluation 
Introduction 
 In order to ensure that the proposed strategy for improving information sharing among 
fusion centers is effective, an evaluation must be completed on the program. Specifically, an 
outcome evaluation will assess the program’s performance and effectiveness in reaching its goals. 
The planning and design of the evaluation will be conducted based upon a measurement system of 
success that will guide the assessment of the program’s outcomes.  
To analyze the program effectively, several fusion centers that provide information sharing 
and analysis for major urban areas must be randomly chosen and evaluated as samples. Data on 
the centers must be collected and an evaluation design must be determined. Additionally, a cost 
benefit analysis of the program will be conducted. Overall, the planned evaluation will assist in 
determining the effectiveness of local fusion centers.   
Evaluation questions. By understanding the operations of fusion centers, their goals and 
objectives, and metrics of success, the evaluation will provide insight into the overall 
effectiveness of my strategy for fusion centers and their information sharing practices. It is also 
important for the evaluation to address existing issues in fusion centers and determine if the new 
strategies can fix those concerns. Several questions must be asked when performing the 
evaluation on local fusion centers. The questions include:  
• What are the goals and objectives of local fusion centers? 
• What are the metrics of success for a fusion center? 
• Are collaborative efforts between the analysts and law enforcement partners 
establishing seamless information sharing? 
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• Does the standardized training program enhance intelligence analysts’ skills and 
capabilities in analysis and dissemination? Does it establish uniformity among all 
fusion centers regarding information sharing policies and procedures? 
• Has the center improved in its efforts to consistently share information? 
• Has the center improved its ability to detect, investigate, and prevent threats in a 
timely manner? 
Policy Analysis Definition/Literature Review 
In order to develop an evaluation system for fusion centers, it is necessary to gain insight 
from previous research on fusion centers and their performance as information sharing hubs. 
Reviewing past incidents involving work produced by the centers will aid in gathering 
information from their efforts, productivity, and overall effectiveness. It also helps to acquire 
information on past failures or successes of the centers and what factors may have attributed to 
those results.  
Theoretical framework. Fusion centers currently operate with intelligence analysts and 
several different law enforcement and homeland security partners (Devine, 2014). A 
standardized training program for fusion center analysts has not yet been created, implemented, 
or utilized in fusion centers. While a standardized training program has not yet been 
implemented and does not appear in previous research, fusion centers analysts are required to 
exhibit certain qualities that ensure they can perform their responsibilities in disseminating 
intelligence and creating analytic products for investigators.  
Previous research on the effectiveness of fusion centers and their information sharing 
practices yields differing results. Opponents of the centers recognize the massive funds that are 
allocated to the centers. Additionally, some scholars and government officials remain concerned 
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that the centers lack productivity and only generate a small number of analytic products related 
to terrorism. Many scholars have conducted research regarding inefficiencies and failures of 
local fusion centers. They discovered that the centers have failed to utilize the information 
available to them to detect terroristic plots in their respective locality. The researchers state that 
there is a lack of focus on the specific community needs and local crimes in the fusion center’s 
local area. Research also shows that their tactical, rather than strategic, nature inhibits their 
efforts to gather and analyze intelligence that results in long-term benefits for national security. 
A few case studies have even shown that the centers hinder federal counterterrorism efforts as 
opposed to supporting them. A lack of continuity among the centers and their partners also 
negatively impacts their work productivity. Finally, a lack of metrics for measuring successes, or 
failures, stems from the absence of federal guidelines and policies for the centers (Devine, 2014).  
While the effectiveness of fusion centers has been in question by some scholars and 
government officials, there are also notable examples in which the facilities have greatly assisted 
in disrupting criminal activity and preventing terrorists’ plots. Some instances whereby the 
centers have experienced notable successes include assisting in sex trafficking related arrests 
(DHS, 2015c), disrupting a synthetic drug ring, and combatting transnational drug networks 
(DHS, 2015d). They have also been involved in providing support to active shooter, money 
laundering, and homicide investigations (DHS, 2015e).  
Additionally, there have been several instances in which state and local fusion centers 
played crucial roles in the identification, analysis, and dissemination of information in terroristic 
plots which led to arrests and prevention of large scale attacks on U.S. soil. Law enforcement 
collaborated with the centers to terminate a plan to detonate explosives on September 11th, 2009 
in the New York City subway system. Additionally, intelligence developed by a fusion center in 
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Massachusetts contributed to the prevention of a terrorist attack in 2011 on the Capitol building 
and the Pentagon in Washington D.C. that involved airplanes packed with C-4 plastic explosives 
(Devine, 2014). In 2012, fusion centers were recognized as the “Most Notable Law Enforcement 
Interdiction, Arrest or Counter-Terrorism Program” (DHS, 2015e, p. 2). In addition to 
apprehending criminals and preventing criminal and terrorist activity, the centers have aided in 
saving lives and avoiding noteworthy physical damages and costs (Devine, 2014). 
Specific needs to be met by the program. Without an evaluation, it would be 
impossible to analyze the performance and effectiveness of fusion centers. The evaluation 
measures the performances of the centers according to their objectives and what they seek to 
achieve. Thus, in order to be considered successful at the end of the evaluation, the centers must 
be measured on specific standards that they must meet as information sharing hubs. This 
includes identifying imminent and emerging threats as they are made, connecting the dots in 
investigations through constant communication with partners, informing partners of developing 
information, producing accurate and timely intelligence, and recognizing the national threat 
picture. It also entails apprehending suspects, coordinating operations to investigate the threat, 
and collaborating to mitigate and prevent criminal and terrorist activity.  
Goals and objectives of the program. Fusion centers have several different goals and 
objectives. The main objective of fusion centers is to facilitate information sharing among 
various partners. A recognized need to fill a communication gap after 9/11 led to the importance 
of the centers and their abilities to practice effective information sharing methods. The goal is to 
provide a mechanism where all law enforcement, public safety, and even private sector partners 
at times, can share threat-related information. The objective of fusion centers is to maximize the 
centers’ abilities to detect, disrupt, investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity 
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(DHS, 2017c). By integrating information sharing in a coherent and efficient manner, fusion 
centers can better provide for the safety of citizens and security of the nation.  
Target population. In an evaluation of a program, the target population is the primary 
group of people that a product or service is aimed at (Newcomer, Hatry, & Wholey, 2015). With 
fusion centers, the target population consists of several groups. First and foremost, the centers 
serve the public. They are facilities that support both the safety of the people and security of the 
nation. In addition to the public, the target population consists of intelligence analysts, local law 
enforcement personnel, and local joint terrorism task force agents. These different groups are 
considered the target population because they are greatly impacted by the new strategies being 
implemented in the fusion centers. It is not only important to ensure that the public sees the 
benefits of the new strategies, but it is also essential for the analysts, local law enforcement 
personnel, and task force agents to want to partake in the new procedures as well.   
Policy Evaluation  
 An evaluation design consists of developing the best possible approaches to take when 
analyzing the strategies of the program. The evaluation of fusion centers must be developed by 
analyzing a few, select centers. These centers will be samples to test as they will allow the 
evaluators to determine whether the implemented strategies have influenced successful 
performances of the facilities. The evaluation design is comprised of the inputs, processes, and 
outcomes of fusion centers. It also entails what factors, such as data collection methods and 
evaluation instruments, will be included in developing the evaluation design and analyzing the 
program. Lastly, the evaluation must include any potential problems that may result from the 
program or evaluation itself as it is important to generate accurate findings.    
 The inter-rater reliability evaluation design measures consistency among raters evaluating 
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performances of a program. It includes measurements of the extent to which data collectors, or 
raters, assign the same score to the same variable in a study. Consisting of individuals who are 
educated on the operations of fusion centers, the inter-rater reliability evaluation design will only 
be utilized to ensure consistency among the raters measuring the uniformity of fusion centers’ 
processes and performances. The inter-rater reliability method will be used to determine if these 
educated raters can achieve a high level of agreement on the performances of the fusion centers 
and if my strategy contributed to successful outcomes (McHugh, 2012).    
 Evaluation instruments. In order to complete the evaluation process so that the raters 
can adequately measure the performance of the centers, the variables of the centers must be 
analyzed. Some variables to consider when evaluating the effect of my strategy on fusion centers 
should include the specific methods utilized to detect the emerging threat, if detected at all, the 
applied processes in transferring the information from one partner to the next, and the time frame 
of investigations. Similarly, certain criteria regarding the performance of the centers must be 
met. The factors attributing to success will help to evaluate the centers and their efficiency and 
effectiveness as a program. In order to determine if fusion centers are successful, the following 
criteria will be used: 
• Detection or identification of emerging threat before it becomes viable (i.e. before 
a terrorist attack is executed) 
• Information passed to other partners in a timely fashion (i.e. as soon as a viable 
lead persists) 
• Weekly production and distribution of intelligence or tactical products to other 
agencies (DHS, 2018e) 
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• Weekly leads vetted by the centers that result in the enhancement or initiation of 
an investigation (DHS, 2018e) 
• Apprehension of suspects as a result of efforts made by fusion centers and their 
law enforcement partners  
• Prevention of widespread criminal or terrorist acts 
Research methods. Gathering useful information for the evaluation of fusion centers can 
be accomplished through the process of raters by trained observers. Trained observers are 
individuals who typically have experience in the subject at hand and thus can provide valuable 
insight on the effectiveness of fusion centers, along with what may or may not be working with 
them. Such individuals already have several related skills necessary to understand the program 
and what would make it successful. This data collection method relies on either volunteer efforts 
or the use of existing personnel. The raters must collect data on the center’s primary mission, the 
quality of analytic products generated, and prior success stories. Raters by trained observers is 
also a relatively low-cost data collection effort (Newcomer et al., 2015).  
 Additionally, focus group interviews are another data collection method that can be 
useful in evaluating fusion centers. Used as a research strategy in gathering information, focus 
groups are often conducted by a moderator who guides a small group of individuals in answering 
a set of carefully sequenced questions. The groups allow for more of a conversation where the 
study participants do not have to reach agreements, but rather provide their insight on the 
program based on the questions that they are given. The questions continue to hone in on the 
specific topic more and more, allowing for detailed answers as the interview continues. Such 
questions help the moderator gain valuable feedback and insight on the program (Newcomer et 
al., 2015).           
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 The groups participating in the interviews would consist of stakeholders such as 
intelligence analysts, local law enforcement, and joint terrorism task force personnel as they are 
all involved in the information sharing processes of the centers and can provide valuable 
feedback. The benefit of focus groups is that they are not only useful in the evaluation phase of a 
program but also in the implementation and design phase. These focus groups can help an 
agency or program identify key factors that need to be addressed or fixed, and how to do so, in 
order to improve the value and effectiveness of the program (Newcomer et al., 2015). 
Cost benefit-analysis. A cost benefit-analysis (CBA) is an effective program evaluation. 
CBA is most useful when analyzing a program in order to determine whether its total benefits to 
society exceed its costs. The negative impacts of the program would be considered costs while 
positive impacts of the program are counted as benefits (Newcomer et al., 2015). Some costs of 
fusion centers may include concern for privacy rights or authority figures overstepping their 
boundaries. In addition, there are monetary costs for items such as computers, information 
technology equipment, and training guides, as well as personnel such as trainers hired for the 
standardized training program for analysts. On the other hand, there are numerous benefits to 
fusion enters. Fusion centers serve all of society by protecting them from the threats that they 
detect and disrupt. Benefits of the centers would include better communication and uniformity 
regarding regulations and practices among the fusion centers. Additionally, the facilities protect 
communities, provide situational awareness, inform important decisions, and enhance 
information sharing among law enforcement and homeland security partners (DHS, 2015b). 
Their overall benefits involve protecting society and keeping them safe from criminal or terrorist 
activity.          
 Limitations. A concern to address regarding the evaluation is how to proceed with the 
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findings of the study, especially if they render undesirable results. If the study results in 
problems of efficiency, it will certainly be a concern for the progress of fusion centers. Questions 
regarding what can be changed or altered to potentially create a beneficial program for fusion 
centers and how would that plan be implemented will arise. In addition, since many program 
evaluations are published online for public view, there may be backlash if the results of the 
evaluation indicate problems of efficiency. In cases like this, the evaluation can still be 
published, but it is essential to detail why such results may have happened. This is important 
because it can help to address what factors or details of the program may need to be fixed in 
order for the program to be effective. There is the potential for the public to gather an 
understanding of the program, the goals it seeks to acquire, and the hope that new strategies can 
be formed to achieve those goals.   
Conclusion 
 In order to ensure successful outcomes, the performances of local fusion centers and the 
impact of my strategy must be evaluated. An efficient evaluation design, along with research and 
data collection on the centers, will provide insight into the operations of the centers and their 
abilities as information sharing hubs. Specifically, the inter-rater reliability evaluation design as 
well as data collection methods including raters by trained observers and focus group interviews 
will aid in completing a valid and efficient evaluation method to properly assess the effectiveness 
of the centers.           
 Chapter 6 will continue to address the development of my strategy regarding information 
sharing for fusion centers, but it will do so for a different country. Chapter 6 will assess my 
proposed strategy for one of America’s allies in the Middle East: Saudi Arabia. 
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Chapter 6: Comparative Governments 
Introduction 
The fight against terrorism is a constant battle faced by many nations. The threat to the 
security of various countries, as well as the safety of the people within them, continues to rise as 
terrorists become more sophisticated in their plans and methods of attack. Due to the rather high 
concern of terrorism in the 21st century, it is essential for nations to develop tactics and strategies 
to combat terrorism and ensure national security.   
The United States has developed several counterterrorism tactics to build its national 
security against threats of terrorism. One of the primary methods that the United States has 
utilized to combat terrorism is the expanded use of intelligence and information sharing through 
fusion centers. Serving as the primary focal points with local and state environments for the 
receipt, gathering, analysis, and sharing of threat-related information among local, tribal, 
territorial, state, and federal partners, fusion centers had previously identified, investigated, and 
thwarted serious threats, both criminal and terrorist, to the country (DHS, 2017c) (DHS, 2015f).  
In addition to implementing counterterrorism measures through the use of fusion centers, 
the United States collaborates with other nations to combat terrorism. A prominent partner of the 
U.S. and their efforts to combat terrorism is Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia cooperates with the U.S. 
to strengthen their efforts to avert terrorist attacks and threats that greatly impact their nation. 
Just as the U.S. has enhanced its national security through the implementation of fusion centers, 
Saudi Arabia, too, can benefit from creating and implementing fusion centers in their nation. In 
turn, Saudi Arabia will be better prepared to defend itself against terrorist activity. The global 
perspective of terrorism in Saudi Arabia, their current counterterrorism efforts, and a proposed 
counterterrorism strategy will be addressed in order to heighten Saudi Arabia’s national security.  
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Global Perspective on Terrorism 
One of the primary terrorist threats that Saudi Arabia faces is from ISIS, also known as 
Daesh and ISIL. Saudi Arabia is one the main targets of ISIS because it is both the birthplace of 
Islam as well as home to the Two Holy Mosques. ISIS often targets Saudi Arabia because they 
perceive the Saudi Arabian government to be un-Islamic and an enemy of theirs that is too 
closely associated with the West. In the past, ISIS has both inspired and launched lethal attacks 
in Saudi Arabia that primarily targeted Saudi security forces and Shia residents. Despite several 
efforts from Saudi Arabia to identify and prevent terrorist attacks, ISIS-affiliated groups were 
able to plan and execute several attacks to their nation (Department of State, n.d.). 
 In addition to ISIS, other threats to Saudi Arabia stem from al-Qaeda. Threats from both 
ISIS and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula continue as both groups encourage individual acts of 
terrorism. In total, Saudi Arabia has faced more than 60 terrorist attacks by both ISIS and al-
Qaeda, resulting in more than 200 deaths of both citizens and police officers. In addition to their 
attacks, ISIS continues to recruit and present their missions, ideologies, and activities on social 
media networks. This use of social media in recruitment has continued to increase significantly 
over time (Saudi Arabia & Counterterrorism Fact Sheet, 2017).  
Impact of terrorism. According to the country reports on terrorism, a total of 34 terrorist 
attacks occurred in Saudi Arabia in 2016, most of which included suicide bombers. On January 
29th 2016, a suicide bomb attack occurred at a mosque in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia 
by a 22-year-old Saudi national. Because of the attack, four worshippers were killed. 
Additionally, on July 4th 2016, coordinated bombings occurred in three cities across Saudi 
Arabia. One suicide bomber wounded two security officers after striking near the U.S. Consulate 
General in Jeddah. Another attack took place on a security post near the Prophet’s Mosque in 
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Medina in which four guards were killed in the process. The third attack occurred near a Shia 
mosque in the Eastern Province city of Qatif. In this attack, only the bomber was killed. In 
addition to the attacks themselves, terrorism financing can greatly impact the nation and lead to 
the execution of the attacks. While Saudi Arabia has sought to maintain supervision of the 
banking sector and strengthen penalties for financing terrorism, there are still allegations that 
funds are collected in secret and then illicitly transferred out of the country in cash (Department 
of State, n.d.). 
Organized crime and conflict. Along with terrorism, organized crime plays a significant 
role in the threats against Saudi Arabia and their stability as a nation. The smuggling of narcotics 
continues to be a challenge along the border areas. Additionally, the threat of kidnappings by 
terrorist groups remains as a potential concern as terrorist organizations may begin to resort to 
targeting individuals rather than carrying out widespread, large-scale attacks. Saudi Arabia has 
also experienced some cyber threats in recent years. In 2012, Saudi Aramco, Saudi’s oil 
company, fell victim to one of the first, well-documented cyber-attacks that occurred in the Gulf. 
Other cyber-attacks that happened in 2016 have impacted both the civil aviation and 
transportation agencies (Saudi Arabia & Counterterrorism April, 2017).  
Furthermore, beggars who often work on the streets in Saudi Arabia attempt to raise 
money and funds for criminal and terrorist activities as they have links to both criminal and 
terrorist groups that operate both in the Kingdom and abroad. The individuals committing these 
crimes are largely illegal workers who may have outstayed their Haj and Umrah visas in the 
country. While the beggars continue to acquire funds in support of their links to the criminal and 
terrorist groups by begging for donations, studies are showing that many are also seeking to 
obtain money through social media. Often beggars will provide a bank account on social media 
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for any individuals who choose to donate. Such practices seem to be appearing more and are 
potential threats in regard to terrorism financing and funding in Saudi Arabia. While Saudi 
Arabia has begun to recognize the threats, inform the public of their plans, and work towards 
preventing the beggars from acquiring funds, it is essential that these acts are prevented 
altogether. Providing funds for terrorists is one of the main factors that allows them to carry out 
their acts of terrorism in the first place (Beggars, 2015).  
As often seen in various areas in the Middle East, ongoing regional conflict could 
potentially affect national security for Saudi Arabia. The instability in Iraq and the war in Yemen 
consistently produce numerous fights and attacks on both the northern and southern borders of 
Saudi Arabia. Yemen’s Houthi militia has launched multiple SCUD missiles into Saudi Arabia. 
These attacks resulted in severe damage to the land and loss of life of the Saudi people. The 
combination of the violence that occurs within miles of the border with Yemen as well as an 
increase in illegal immigration and smuggling from the southern border contributes to a very real 
threat to Saudi Arabia and its safety and security (Department of State, 2017a).  
International Counter-Terrorism Strategies 
In 2016, despite the attacks that took place, Saudi Arabia developed initiatives and 
counterterrorism measures to prevent further incidents. As a result of their efforts, they arrested 
several terrorist suspects, disrupted active terrorist cells all across the Kingdom, and reinforced 
their capacity to combat violent extremist ideologies. They also heightened their law 
enforcement and intelligence efforts in the fight against terrorism (Department of State, n.d.).
 Role of law enforcement. Law enforcement officials in Saudi Arabia frequently work 
directly with the community. They include large numbers of high-profile uniformed and plain-
clothed officers who work openly and covertly throughout communities (Department of State, 
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2017a). Neighborhood police units seek to work with the community in order to encourage 
citizens to provide information about suspected terrorist activity. Law enforcement authorities 
also focus highly on preventing terrorism financing. They impose financial sanctions regarding 
terrorism funding to deter offenders from providing money to terrorists and essentially aiding in 
their plans of execution. Such sanctions are imposed on any individuals or entities who act on 
behalf of or provide support for terrorist groups including, but not limited to, Hizballah, 
al‑Qa’ida (AQ), Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LeT), and the Taliban (Department of State, n.d.). 
Role of intelligence. When first recognizing the need for intelligence, Saudi Arabia 
sought to build facilities that could provide information for decision makers and participate with 
other security services. As a result, Saudi Arabia set up an intelligence service beginning with 
the opening of an office for intelligence in the year 1376 Hijra, corresponding to 1955, under the 
name of “Al-Mabahith Al-Aammah,” or General Investigations (Saudi Secret Service, 2000-
2019). Over time intelligence continued to expand as a valuable source of security and the 
General Intelligence Presidency became the primary intelligence agency in Saudi Arabia today 
(Saudi Intelligence Agencies, 2017). 
The General Intelligence Presidency (GIP) is tasked with ensuring national security 
through information analysis. The center reports back to the King of Saudi Arabia providing him 
with valuable information, assessments, and strategic evaluations. The center is highly important 
to the country as it is the most accredited advisor to the ruler, giving him insight on potential 
threats and how best to mitigate them. The GIP consists of several personnel and offices within 
the center. This includes an Inspector General for protocol, an office for External Relations, and 
an office for the Presidency. Over time, the Presidency continued to expand and experience 
numerous developments. They opened offices abroad and set up local branches to cover various 
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areas of Saudi Arabia. Such branches comprise the Department for Financial and Administrative 
Affairs, the Department for Communications and Tapping, a Training and Planning Department, 
a Technical Department, an Operations Department, and an Analysis Department that is sub-
divided into different themes such as politics and terrorism. The Director of the GIP is also 
supported by a deputy. Additionally, the Presidency was reorganized to include qualified 
personnel with unique expertise in intelligence and national security. The personnel began to 
undergo training courses in areas such as computer science in order to develop skills for their 
work and develop their capabilities in technology (Saudi Secret Service, 2000-2019).  
The GIP runs both strategic and counter intelligence operations. The center coordinates 
information collection and intelligence production practices, plans the activities of national 
intelligence services, and carries out research and studies. They present their findings to decision 
makers to draw up both internal and external policies built on the intelligence that the Presidency 
produces. The center also establishes mutual relations with security services of other countries 
that are considered to be their allies as they preside over the bilateral relationship with outside, 
foreign intelligence agencies (Saudi Secret Service, 2000-2019) (Saudi Intelligence Agencies, 
2017).  
While the GIP remains as the most prominent intelligence agency, Saudi Arabia 
maintains other agencies that make up their intelligence community. They comprise of the 
National Guard, the Ministry of Defense and Aviation, the Ministry of Interior, and the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry of Defense and Aviation retains its own Information and 
Security department and is tasked with focusing on policing and military intelligence. The 
Ministry of Interior has its own domestic intelligence agency that remains in charge of the fight 
against terrorism in Saudi Arabia and lastly, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs acts as the 
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intermediary between Saudi Arabia and foreign intelligence agencies. It provides both analysis 
and evaluations on regional affairs. These centers, just as the GIP, report back to the King of 
Saudi Arabia. The King essentially remains as the Commander in Chief, presiding over these 
organizations (Saudi Intelligence Agencies, 2017). 
Coordination from an international multifaceted approach. In recent years, Saudi 
Arabia has become one of the leading nations in seeking to combat terrorism and terrorism 
financing. Saudi Arabia has acknowledged the importance of counterterrorism strategies and in 
2014 issued a royal decree on it. The decree on counterterrorism reinforced that acts of terrorism, 
terrorist organizations, recruitment through social media, and participation in terrorist activity 
will not be tolerated. Often, the Kingdom presents public education campaigns to discredit the 
terrorists and condemn their activities. They also monitor their mosques in order to prevent 
political or religious incitement. In addition to removing any preachers who may advocate for 
radical ideologies, they send these preachers through programs to re-educate them and rid them 
of their radical ideologies. Saudi Arabia also works with individuals who are affected by terrorist 
recruitment and messages by placing them in de-radicalization programs (Saudi Arabia & 
Counterterrorism Fact Sheet, 2017).  
Saudi Arabia retains close ties with international communities. They are members of the 
Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, co-leaders of the Counter ISIS Finance Group (CIFG), and a 
founding member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum. Saudi security professionals continue 
to participate in various joint programs around the world in order to build counterterrorism 
tactics. In December of 2015, they established the Saudi-led Islamic Military Alliance to Fight 
Terrorism where representatives from a total of 39 different countries attended in order to focus 
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on discussing financial, ideological, military, and media aspects of counterterrorism measures 
(Department of State, n.d.). 
One of the main countries that Saudi Arabia cooperates and collaborates with is the 
United States. They maintain a strong counterterrorism relationship with the United States and 
look to them for assistance, if necessary, especially since the Middle East tends to experience a 
vast amount of terrorist attacks. Overall, however, the relationship is mutual in that both 
countries view each other as allies and seek to work together to combat terrorism. For example, 
while the United States has supported Saudi Arabia through restraining Iranian conduct, Saudi 
Arabia has also aided the States by influencing the modeling of United States’ counter-
radicalization programs after their own approach (Saudi Arabia & Counterterrorism April, 2017).  
In order to ensure the safety of both the Saudi and U.S. citizens within Saudi Arabian 
territories and abroad, the countries have continued to strengthen their collaborative efforts in the 
past couple of years. First and foremost, both countries combat terrorism through the joint 
military and finance task forces that are operated by the two countries. They work closely 
together to track and close down illicit money-transfer centers that would otherwise allow the 
terrorists to carry out their plans. Together they strive to defeat Daesh, Al Qaeda, and Iranian-
sponsored extremism and expansionism. By sharing information, the United States and Saudi 
Arabia cooperate with each other in seeking to shut down the funds from western banks to 
Middle Eastern extremists that finance the terrorists’ activities. Saudi Arabia has even developed 
“fusion cells” where certain partners, namely Saudi Arabian intelligence officials and law 
enforcement personnel from the U.S., can work together to investigate and interdict both 
terrorism plots and finances (Saudi Arabia & Counterterrorism April, 2017). 
Human Rights Concerns  
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Similar to human rights guaranteed to individuals in the United States, the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia contains laws that prohibit “unlawful intrusions into the privacy of persons, their 
homes, places of work, and vehicles” (Department of State, 2017b, p. 20). Law enforcement 
officials are required to follow certain precautions such as providing search warrants and 
maintaining records of searches that are conducted on individuals. Based upon such regulations, 
human rights of privacy apply to Saudi Arabia as they do in America. Intelligence facilities in 
Saudi Arabia must refrain from overstepping their authority when collecting and sharing data on 
individuals so that they do not infringe upon privacy rights (Department of State, 2017b). 
Proposed Counter-Terrorism Strategy  
Although Saudi Arabia has strengthened their counterterrorism efforts through the 
development of their intelligence facilities, they have yet to advance the General Intelligence 
Presidency into a fusion center as the United States has. Once the country transforms their main 
intelligence center, the GIP, into a fusion center, they can then expand their implementation of 
fusion centers into several intelligence facilities in the nation.  
Creation of fusion center. While the GIP in Saudi Arabia exhibits several unique 
capabilities that allow the center to be a useful tool to national security, Saudi Arabia can 
certainly benefit from taking the intelligence center and transforming it into a fusion center. In 
fact, Saudi Arabia seems to be moving in such a direction as they have already established 
“fusion cells” where intelligence officials and law enforcement personnel, as well as officials 
from other countries, work together to investigate terrorism plots and financing (Saudi Arabia & 
Counterterrorism April, 2017). Nonetheless, transforming the General Intelligence Presidency 
into a fusion center that exhibits unique information sharing capabilities to detect and prevent 
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threats will enhance Saudi Arabia’s ability to protect their people and ensure their national 
security.  
Two-part strategy. First and foremost, in order to transform Saudi Arabia’s General 
Intelligence Presidency into a fusion center, numerous connections with law enforcement 
partners must be created and maintained. This entails acquiring police officers to work side by 
side the intelligence analysts in the office of the General Intelligence Presidency. It is essential 
for law enforcement personnel and intelligence analysts to work together to develop partnerships 
for the seamless flow of information sharing. When the officers and analysts can share 
information more seamlessly, they have a higher chance of identifying connections between 
cases or suspects that may be a high threat to the nation. While there will be a select amount of 
law enforcement officials in the center to support the analysts and vice versa, they will also 
provide the analysts with information from officers who remain on the streets and directly 
converse with the community.  
In order to ensure that analysts and law enforcement officers cooperate effectively, there 
should also be collaborative meetings with partners. National meetings with the intelligence 
community, government officials, and law enforcement officers must be held monthly. This will 
help to retain constant communication and cooperation in Saudi Arabia’s counterterrorism 
efforts. These collaborative, intelligence meetings should entail potential threats to be aware of 
as well as areas of concern where there may need to be an increase in law enforcement presence. 
The meetings must also encourage feedback from those attending. Participation is essential in 
gathering information on how best to proceed with keeping the communities safe and 
establishing security against terrorism in Saudi Arabia.      
 Once the GIP is developed into a fusion center to enhance information sharing practices, 
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a standardized training program for the intelligence analysts in the center must be developed. 
Because intelligence analysts collect information and transform it into valuable intelligence, they 
also have the responsibility of informing decision makers, such as the King of Saudi Arabia, on 
potential threats facing the country (DHS, 2017c). As a result of their duties in informing 
decision makers, they must be able to produce both accurate and timely intelligence. 
Additionally, because Saudi Arabia and the U.S. often collaborate with one another and share 
intelligence for counterterrorism purposes, it is valuable for intelligence analysts in Saudi Arabia 
to undergo similar training requirements as analysts in the U.S. in order to retain similar skills 
and learn similar procedures for gathering and sharing intelligence (Department of State, n.d.). 
To ensure analysts retain the skills necessary from the training program, the program 
must consist of three months so that they have sufficient time to learn protocols on information 
gathering, analytic product development, and intelligence sharing. Throughout the program, 
analysts must focus on three categories of expertise for their role as intelligence analysts 
defending the national security of Saudi Arabia. First, they must develop expertise in analysis 
and the development of intelligence briefings, maps, charts, graphs, and threat assessments. 
Second, analysts must be trained in information technology. Not only does an analyst have to be 
tech savvy to perform their everyday duties, but as cyber terrorism becomes more prevalent in 
the 21st century, analysts must also enhance their technological skills. Such sub-categories should 
include learning about security measures, databases, and how to both store and maintain valuable 
information. Third, the training program must contain certain protocols and procedures for 
analysts to follow when serious threats are detected. The system must consist of the steps to take 
in preventing the threat and how best to inform decision makers. This also includes knowing the 
laws of Saudi Arabia to avoid infringing upon privacy rights.    
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 Transforming the General Intelligence Presidency of Saudi Arabia into a fusion center 
will significantly enhance both the safety and security of the nation. The fusion center will not 
only provide for valuable intelligence but it will encourage and produce effective information 
sharing. Fostering information sharing is essential in detecting threats, developing leads, 
apprehending suspects, and preventing threats before they become viable. In this process, the 
fusion center will become a valuable asset to the government, law enforcement officials, and the 
general public of Saudi Arabia seeking to remain safe and defend their national security.  
Conclusion  
 While Saudi Arabia has certainly made progress in their counterterrorism efforts in the 
past several years, the threat of terrorism is always expanding. As terrorists become smarter and 
more sophisticated in their plans of attack, it is essential that Saudi Arabia develops new 
procedures to enhance their efforts to combat terrorism. As terrorism has greatly impacted their 
country, Saudi Arabia has recognized the value in collaborating internationally, namely with the 
United States as an ally and supporter in preventing terrorism. Just as the development of fusion 
centers and information sharing capabilities has assisted in detecting and preventing acts of 
terrorism in the U.S., it can foster similar results for Saudi Arabia. The creation of a fusion center 
in Saudi Arabia will allow for advanced partnerships and communication efforts between 
intelligence analysts and law enforcement officials, thus producing seamless information sharing. 
In addition, it will heighten the abilities of the intelligence analysts to detect threats, analyze 
information, and produce valuable and efficient intelligence for the Saudi Arabian government. 
By generating a fusion center based on those already developed in the United States and 
implementing these strategies, Saudi Arabia will enhance their safety for the public and national 
security against any and all criminal and terrorist threats.       
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 In the next chapter, Chapter 7, international human rights will be discussed. More 
specifically, the development of fusion centers in the United States, their information sharing 
strategies, and their connection to international human rights will be analyzed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
69 
INFORMATION SHARING: LOCAL FUSION CENTERS  
 
 Chapter 7: International Human Rights 
Introduction              
While developing and improving information sharing capabilities for local fusion centers 
is beneficial in detecting and preventing threats, it is essential to consider its impact on 
international human rights. Human rights include rights that are inherent to all human beings. 
Regardless of any sex, race, ethnicity, religion, or other status, human beings are born free and 
equal in rights and dignity. The right to life, liberty and security of person are a few rights that 
are innate to each human being (United Nations, n.d.). Because these rights are innate, it is 
crucial that the strategies developed to enhance information sharing capabilities among fusion 
centers do not infringe upon international human rights. By taking precautionary measures to 
safeguard rights while developing information gathering and sharing methods for fusion centers, 
the centers can maintain security for the public and protect human rights.   
Theoretical Understanding and International Policies  
Both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights are international laws that detail several rights that are universally protected. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights promotes the strengthening of respect for all 
fundamental freedoms and human rights. Some rights include a fair and public hearing by an 
impartial tribunal, protection against any arbitrary arrests or cruel punishments, and the right to 
recognition everywhere as an individual before the law. Additionally, the law explains that no 
one may be subjected to any arbitrary interference with their privacy, home, or family, nor 
experience any attacks upon their reputation. It also states that all people are entitled to equal 
protection against any form of discrimination. The declaration endorses understanding and 
tolerance among all nations and religious or racial groups for the maintenance of peace (United 
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Nations, n.d.).           
 Similarly, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights recognizes the inherent dignity and 
inalienable rights of all individuals as well as supports and defends human being’s political 
freedoms and economic, social, and cultural rights. Rights incorporated in the covenant include 
equality before the law, freedom of opinion and expression, and protection of minority rights. It 
also prohibits arbitrary interference with privacy as well as discrimination and advocacy of both 
racial or religious hatred (United Nations, 1996-2019).   
Human rights and fusion centers. Prominent concepts in human rights include freedom 
from interference with privacy, equality before the law, and freedom from discrimination (United 
Nations, n.d.). Not only are these rights fundamental human rights guaranteed to all, but they 
relate greatly to fusion centers and some concerns for their activities. While local fusion centers 
intend to protect individuals through information sharing practices to detect and prevent threats, 
they have to ensure that in the process they do not violate privacy and equality rights.   
 Freedom from interference with privacy. Privacy is a recognized human right that 
guarantees freedom from government interference. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
explains that no individual can be subjected to arbitrary interference with their privacy, home, 
correspondence, or family. Additionally, they cannot be subjected to attacks on their reputation 
(United Nations, n.d.). While individuals are protected against such interference, many question 
fusion centers’ activities in regard to privacy rights and how much the government may be 
interfering in their personal lives. As fusion centers integrate and analyze information and 
intelligence, the apprehension is that the adoption of such proactive approaches in collecting 
information intrudes upon individuals’ privacy (Masse et al., 2007).     
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 Equality before the law. Additionally, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states 
that all individuals are equal before the law and receive equal protection under it. Thus, they 
cannot be discriminated against in any way (United Nations, n.d.). When gathering information 
and intelligence in fusion centers, it is important that religious, racial, or political profiling does 
not influence data collection. Due to the amount of data that the centers aggregate, there are 
concerns that individuals may be subjected to unjustified scrutiny based on innocuous activities, 
their religious or political beliefs, or racial status (The Constitution Project, 2012).  
National Security and Human Rights   
When developing strategies for homeland security, there is often a difficult balance 
between the implementation of public safety strategies and sustaining human rights. The 
difficulty lies in balancing the protection of innate human rights that are guaranteed to everyone 
and ensuring safety and security for those same individuals. Not only can my strategy raise some 
concerns about fusion centers’ activities in relation to violating privacy rights or profiling certain 
individuals, but sharing such information may cause problems for the relationship between 
fusion centers and the public (DOJ, 2010b). It can lead to distrust and rather than people 
supporting fusion center efforts to better detect and prevent threats to protect them, they may end 
up rejecting the centers and their efforts (The Constitution Project, 2012).   
 In the process of enhancing strategies to protect the public from adverse criminal or 
terrorist activity, measures must be taken to assure them that their inherent human rights are 
protected. In order to retain the protection of human rights, fusion centers must enforce data 
security, accountability and transparency, and effective training. These measures will help to 
develop procedures to protect rights when collecting and sharing high volumes of sensitive 
information (The Constitution Project, 2012).  
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Data security. Data security is essential in fusion centers due to the vast amounts of 
information that they gather, share, and store. Because in some instances fusion centers access 
information from databases from other institutions and agencies at the local, state, and federal 
levels, consistent security of the shared data may be difficult. One way to monitor data security is 
to enforce audit logs where individuals accessing, storing, and sharing information are checked 
regularly and are held accountable for their actions. The logs often record network activity 
including the user making a certain query, the nature of the query itself, and the information 
accessed in the process. Not only does this process deter users from accessing and using 
information improperly, but the logs may also protect against intrusion into databases from 
unauthorized outsiders or hackers (The Constitution Project, 2012).  
Accountability and transparency. Often due to the rapid pace of advancements in 
information technology, as well as the nation’s rather limited experience with the centers’ 
concepts, it is difficult for policymakers to truly understand the nature of fusion center activity. 
The secrecy that exists around the centers also causes concern for public oversight. As a result, 
fusion centers should first develop clear mission statements that detail the purpose of their 
activities and the metrics upon which their performances should be evaluated in order for the 
public to understand the centers’ goals. They should also publish the descriptions of their 
activities, staffing, budgets, and more. The information will have to remain somewhat broad to 
refrain from posting classified information, but the public will at least be aware of their policies 
and procedures. Developing such information and making it available to the public creates 
openness between fusion center personnel and the community. Consequently, the public can gain 
an understanding of the centers’ practices and perhaps gain trust in their activities, thus 
increasing public cooperation (The Constitution Project, 2012).      
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 Since the databases in fusion centers contain sensitive, personal information, the 
databases should provide redress for individuals who believe that the systems contain inaccurate 
information about them. Redress mechanisms are important because individuals subjected to 
inaccurate information may potentially find themselves subject to repeated, intrusive 
investigation. An effective redress, however, ensures the accuracy of information stored in fusion 
center databases and allows for the opportunity for corrective action should errors occur (The 
Constitution Project, 2012). 
Training. Finally, standardized training must include a section on legal regulations in 
data collection. Training the analysts early on in their careers about the necessary precautions to 
take when collecting information will help them to develop practices that support human rights. 
Training analysts on legal regulations regarding data collection and storage will also assist in 
developing trust among them and the public.  
The aforementioned measures to maintain rights while ensuring security strengthen the 
trust between the public and fusion centers. Rather than the public opposing the operations of the 
centers due to potential violations of human rights, they can instead support them. They may 
recognize their efforts to build greater security for the public and defend them against criminal 
activity and terroristic threats. Additionally, local communities may even aid in fusion centers’ 
efforts and partner with them to assist in reducing crime. By taking measures to protect human 
rights while enhancing homeland security strategies, fusion centers can start to close the gap 
between protecting international human rights and ensuring security.  
Practical Application of Human Rights Today  
Developing information sharing practices among fusion centers by enhancing 
partnerships and implementing training for intelligence analysts, however, may inadvertently 
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break international law. Enhancing partnerships leads to an increase in the amount of people that 
have access to information. It creates a constant, rapid flow of information and intelligence being 
shared between various partners. In the process of a significant amount of people gathering and 
sharing personal, sensitive, and classified information, it is easy to inadvertently pass along 
information not privy to all. Similarly, training analysts in new ways to collect data on 
individuals can have adverse repercussions as the public can become concerned that certain 
analysts may utilize those skills to overstep their boundaries, and doing so undetected, when 
gathering data. The apprehension is that rather than remaining objective, personal biases or 
opinions may lead to potential profiling, causing discrimination concerns and breaking 
international laws that ensure equal treatment for all.     
International law is not only created to uphold valuable rights for the people, but to 
ensure security and peace among varying nations (United Nations, n.d.). Breaking international 
law could greatly comprise innate human rights as well as peace and security between different 
countries, causing concerns for the safety of the public and security of the United States. For 
these reasons, fusion centers must operate under Constitutional law while remaining mindful of 
international law.  
Conclusion            
 While improving strategies for fusion centers, it is imperative that human rights and 
international laws protecting them are upheld. International laws protect the public and ensure 
that they retain rights such as protection from unwarranted government interference as well as 
equality and fair treatment (United Nations, n.d.). Breaking such laws would severely infringe 
upon the rights of the public, and ultimately cause distrust and conflict between the public and 
fusion centers.           
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 In order to ensure that human rights are protected when developing strategies for local 
fusion centers, it is vital to include certain precautionary measures in the strategies. Increased 
data security, accountability among law enforcement officials and analysts, transparency among 
the centers’ practices, and lessons on legal regulations regarding privacy are a few measures that 
can be taken to protect human rights (The Constitution Project, 2012). Overall, these 
precautionary measures develop a sense of trust and dependency among the public and fusion 
centers. Through such processes, public trust and cooperation can be gained while also 
strengthening resilience and security. 
 In Chapter 8, various intelligence gathering strategies and techniques regarding local 
fusion centers will be addressed. A threat assessment on the nation state of China and its 
increased intelligence efforts will also be completed. 
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Chapter 8: Intelligence Gathering Strategies 
Introduction 
As advancements in technology and the availability and access to information grow, new 
threats to the United States intelligence community emerge. Such advancements have led to the 
expansion of cyber threats emanating from hackers, terrorists, and nation states threatening the 
security of the U.S. and the safety of its people. In particular, China’s cyber capabilities continue 
to excel, expanding their abilities to collect information and intelligence and making them a 
viable threat to the U.S. and its intelligence community. China’s role in developing technological 
advancements and cyber proficiencies also contribute to their emerging global influence.  
As a result of such impending threats from China, United States’ local government 
officials must recognize and anticipate cyber-attacks and enhance U.S. intelligence gathering and 
sharing strategies to combat them. In order to expand intelligence efforts to combat such threats, 
local law enforcement must expand coordination with the federal government and the private 
sector to acquire greater resources and assistance. Such collaborative efforts in intelligence 
gathering and sharing can be fostered through the use of intelligence fusion centers. 
Collaborating and coordinating with local fusion centers to gather and share timely and accurate 
intelligence will assist the U.S. intelligence community in detecting, investigating, and 
preventing threatening cyberwar activities from China. 
Literature Review 
The intelligence cycle. The process of gathering valuable intelligence stems from six 
important steps known as the intelligence cycle. The intelligence cycle is utilized to transform 
raw information into finished, actionable intelligence used by consumers and decision makers. 
The six steps of the intelligence cycle include planning and direction, collection, processing and 
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exploitation, analysis and production, dissemination, and evaluation (Director of National 
Intelligence, 2011).         
 Planning and direction includes identifying and understanding the consumer’s 
intelligence requirements in order to plan the following steps accordingly. Collection is the 
gathering of the raw data, or information, involved in developing the intelligence product. 
Processing and exploitation consist of transforming the raw information into a comprehensive 
format for the final product. This stage requires highly skilled and trained individuals, as well as 
advanced technological systems and equipment, who are capable of converting the raw 
information into understandable and useable information. The analysis and production phase 
entails integrating, analyzing, and preparing the information for its final stages to create 
actionable intelligence. Dissemination is the delivery of the finished product to the consumer 
who requested the intelligence product. Lastly, the final step of the intelligence cycle is 
evaluation. As intelligence products are developed, it is essential to acquire feedback and 
evaluate such feedback to ensure understanding of consumers’ evolving information 
requirements and needs. Following the intelligence cycle and developing actionable intelligence 
is important as intelligence influences decisions and drives response efforts to various threats 
(Director of National Intelligence, 2011).       
China’s historical activities. China has long been involved in cyber espionage within 
the United States. Hacking from China was first observed in 1999 when Chinese patriotic 
hackers planted messages on several United States government websites denouncing previous 
actions made by NATO. After an international dispute in 2001, the patriotic hackers committed 
similar acts, defacing the White House site as well as numerous other United States websites. 
The Chinese continued, and advanced their cyber intrusions in 2003 when hackers stole sensitive 
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data from computers of the United States Department of Defense. The origin of the attack was 
traced back to southern China and was believed to have stemmed from their army. The hackers 
also stole data from defense contractors and several other government agencies. The intrusions 
appeared to start with spear-phishing, a hacking mechanism that includes sending faux emails to 
acquire confidential information. Throughout this time, China managed to steal government 
usernames and passwords as well as intellectual property that included Google’s source code and 
proposals for weapons systems. In 2013, the U.S. connected a Chinese espionage group to 
stealing data, hundreds of terabytes worth, from approximately 141 companies since 2006. The 
espionage group was ultimately linked to the People’s Liberation Army in China, leading to the 
U.S. indicting the Chinese officers involved in the hacking and economic espionage (Denning, 
2017).             
 Several years ago, Beijing initiated a cyber-enabled industrial attack, stealing intellectual 
property from the United States to benefit from U.S. companies’ innovations in information 
technology and aerospace. Such cyber intrusions and thefts by China led to significant economic 
loss in the U.S, leading the U.S. government to threaten sanctions against Chinese officials and 
companies associated with the cyber thefts. The threat of imposing sanctions ultimately resulted 
in a negotiated agreement between the U.S. and China in 2015. The agreement established that 
neither the United States nor China would conduct any cyber theft of intellectual property for 
commercial advantage. It asserted that hacking private companies for commercial benefits was 
simply unacceptable. While companies, soon after, recorded steep declines in hacking 
performances by the Chinese against the United States, Chinese hackings have recently begun to 
appear again (Laskai & Segal, 2019).        
 In prior years, the intelligence community in the U.S. had begun to acknowledge China’s 
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potential cyber intrusions made through the company Huawei. Huawei supplies various telecom 
equipment and is the world’s largest producer of such supplies (Muller, 2018). It is a widely 
known Chinese organization that accumulates a significant amount of revenue per year and 
maintains several offices worldwide. The company, however, has recently been banned by 
numerous agencies due to security concerns and espionage threats. Starting in 2010, the U.S. 
warned both private companies and agencies of the organization advising that they were acting 
as a proxy for Chinese government espionage (Fazzini, 2018) and there was growing concern 
that the company’s network gear could contain “back doors” allowing Chinese spies to 
effectively hack into critical network infrastructure. With the threats of the company’s equipment 
being used to spy on the U.S., as well as other countries, the U.S. has recently requested the 
arrest of a top Huawei executive (Muller, 2018).  
Key Threat Assessment 
China’s intelligence. Historically, China’s purpose, definition, and goal of intelligence 
remained similar to the United States, demonstrating the importance of valuable knowledge in 
decision making and preventing advances of adversaries that could cause harm. More modern 
definitions of Chinese intelligence include the importance of gathering information to foster 
domestic stability, ensure national security, and protect corporate interests in a rather competitive 
world. Although somewhat similar to the U.S. intelligence uses, intelligence organizations 
operate in regard to national policy and the country’s needs and priorities. Chinese intelligence, 
as a result, tends to focus more on domestic terrorism, which is typically different from the U.S., 
as China often has fewer foreign links. Due to the expansion of the Internet and mobile 
communications in China, Chinese authorities have also increased investment in their internal 
security (Mattis, 2012).          
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 While previously influenced by intelligence-led policing, in recent years, China began to 
adopt “public security informatization” (Mattis, 2012, p. 50) indicating the value in integrating 
public information more closely with police operations. This included developing domestic 
intelligence gathering and ensuring information management. China formerly directed its 
officers to focus on information collection regarding social disturbances in order to link and 
aggregate local and national level databases with personal information from various businesses 
requiring government name registration. The information provided in such databases would be 
utilized to automatically generate tasks for the country’s police officers when a person-of-interest 
would turn up in their jurisdiction. Later, the Chinese integrated such information collection and 
intelligence practices with public opinion monitoring to influence decision making about actions 
in the public sphere. In addition to supporting decision making in China, Chinese intelligence is 
utilized by their military forces to manipulate decision making of adversaries, develop offensive 
counterintelligence, and improve capabilities to destroy opponents’ technical skills (Mattis, 
2012).  
Enhancing capabilities. With rapid advancements in technology and the cyber world, 
China has sought to make improvements regarding the expansion of their cyberwarfare 
capabilities. More specifically, Chinese leadership has begun to collaborate with the military, 
corporations, and universities to improve cyber capabilities. In 2017, the Chinese Education 
Ministry and the Central Cyberspace Affairs Leading Group developed a joint decree 
formalizing various rules on building first-rate cybersecurity schools. The goal of the plan is 
to develop approximately four to six world-class cyber security schools in universities in 
China. Such schools will be utilized solely for training purposes to create cyber experts. After 
several years of training in school, the students will work in a corporate setting and 
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outstanding graduates will become members of the Strategic Support Force, a wing of  the 
People’s Liberation Army that is in charge of electronic and cyber warfare. Such collaboration 
with Chinese universities demonstrates the extent to which China has begun to expand its cyber 
capabilities. The training in the universities exhibits the enhancements of China’s identification, 
recruitment, and establishment of numerous highly skilled individuals with cyber proficiencies 
who will then work in the cyber and technology division of China’s military force (Yang, 2017).   
As technologies such as cloud-based computer networks and IoT (Internet of Things) and 
various devices and systems connected to the Internet expand, China seeks to steal technological 
innovations from other advanced countries, such as the United States, to utilize for their own 
benefits. Various U.S. entities such as sectors focusing on artificial intelligence, Internet 
connected devices, cloud computing, energy, biotechnology, high-end medical devices and more 
were targeted in 2017 and 2018 by hackers believed to be linked to China. They have also been 
continuously accused of hacking companies involved in industrial manufacturing, aerospace, 
healthcare, solar, and electronics. It is important to consider what companies or 
government facilities may have also been hacked by China, but went unnoticed and 
undetected as a result of their advanced proficiencies (Harrell, 2018).     
 A recent cyber-attack on the Marriott hotel chain is believed to have been enabled by 
China’s intelligence as the U.S. identified computer patterns and codes from the hack that are 
typically associated with Chinese cyber operations. The attack was performed in order to gather 
personal information on millions of Americans, namely government and military personnel, as 
the Marriott hotel is the top hotel where law enforcement and military officials stay. The attack 
resulted in the Chinese being able to retrieve security clearance files of several Americans. 
Security clearances tend to contain birth dates, phone numbers, financial data, family 
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information, and itineraries such as meetings with foreigners. Additionally, Marriott databases do 
not only contain credit card information, but passport data as well. It was estimated that 
approximately 327 million consumers were impacted as a result of Chinese hackers stealing their 
passport numbers. U.S. intelligence reports reveal China’s plans and efforts to obtain names of 
American government officials and executives with security clearances and build a database with 
such information (Sanger, Perlroth, Thursh, & Rappeport, 2018).   
Additionally, one of the most damaging breaches of security for the United States 
government occurred when China hacked the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) in 2014, 
acquiring approximately 23 million records of American federal workers. The OPM is the main 
source for federal government personnel records which include sensitive information. Financial 
data, social security numbers, and documents containing personal information about those who 
apply for security clearances are included in the records. Similar to the attack on the Marriott 
Hotel, Chinese hackers were also able to retrieve information on relatives of those who apply for 
security clearances. Initiating a two-part attack, Chinese actors disguised themselves as 
employees of a subcontractor group, KeyPoint Government Solutions, and installed malware, 
compromising OPM’s records (Gertz, 2019). While the attack on the OPM took place in 2014, it 
was not discovered until 2015. Gathering and aggregating personal data, especially of American 
government personnel, is a major concern for the safety and security of the U.S. China’s ability 
to access and obtain this personal information leaves the U.S. vulnerable to further threats as 
China has the advantage of retaining that information to potentially leverage policy or decisions 
impacting the U.S. (Sanger et al., 2018).      
 China’s global influence. China’s recognition of the expansion of the cyber world and 
its influence has led them to develop approximately a five-year plan involving cyber 
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enhancements that began back in 2016. The primary function of the plan is to develop cyber 
innovations in China as well as expand their cyber influence globally. In order to accomplish 
this, the Chinese are focusing on certain cyber and technological developments such as quantum 
computing, robotics, semiconductors, and artificial intelligence (AI). Developing, expanding, 
and improving such technologies will significantly enhance China’s influence over the global 
market as well as give them power in the cyber realm (Segal, 2018).    
 Unlike most computers, quantum computing gives the computers the ability to perform 
several calculations at once. Combining technology and mathematics, quantum computing 
enables a significant increase in the rate at which a problem may be solved. Not only would 
developments and advancements in quantum computing result in potential economic benefits, 
but Chinese intelligence may be able to break through current, modern encryptions (Segal, 
2018).            
 Additionally, the Chinese seek to develop artificial intelligence for military purposes with 
a focus on autonomous drone swarms and software programs to defend against cyberattacks. In 
order to determine what AI capabilities to develop research on, the Chinese government has 
studied what AI companies contain the most advanced systems. These companies include 
Alibaba, the e-commerce company, and iFLYTEK, a voice recognition software establishment. 
The organizations are among the first to develop superior systems that can drive autonomous 
cars, act as intelligent voice assistants, and manage smart cities. Learning from these companies 
who have developed some of the greatest AI capabilities today will help China to determine how 
to further enhance such developments and excel in AI proficiencies, giving China a greater 
advantage over cyber global influence (Segal, 2018).      
 Social media. In addition to technological advancements, social media and its prevalence 
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around the world significantly contributes to China’s global influence. More people in China 
currently have access to the Internet than any other country (Segal, 2018). Their abilities to 
access, view, and utilize the Internet allow China to use social media as a means to obtain social 
and political instability, assisting in carrying out movements and protests that the Chinese 
government seeks to trigger. Social media remains as a source for information dissemination that 
aids the government in furthering their political and social agendas. By monitoring social media 
accounts and sites, they can continue to influence the spread of political or social unrest. The 
easy access to the Internet, the constant utilization of social media, and the rapid spread of 
information makes social media a significant platform for influencing political and social change 
(Jinghua, 2019). China is even working to develop ways to use artificial intelligence for 
programs that gain access to social media to predict political movements (Segal, 2018).   
 Solutions. In order to protect companies and agencies from cyber intrusions, the 
Department of Homeland Security strongly encourages the private sector to take defense 
precautions. While cyber precautionary measures are beneficial and companies should protect 
their information and consumers from cyberattacks, it is important to focus on analyzing the 
scope of cyber threats and identifying those behind them. The Department of Homeland Security 
has sought to enhance public-private partnerships, as well as develop new technologies, that will 
improve practices in cybersecurity. Collaboration efforts can be enhanced by gathering 
information on cyber threats from the public sector and leveraging resources from the private 
sector. Combined, such partnerships will contribute to identifying, mitigating, and preventing 
cyberattacks from China (Harrell, 2018).      
 Intelligence gathering. Local law enforcement officials are often the first to detect a 
potential threat to the community as well as the first to respond to it. Due to their situational 
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awareness, it is crucial to enforce efficient and effective information gathering techniques to 
recognize signs of cyber intrusions early on as well as develop actionable intelligence to 
influence response efforts and further prevent the threat. In order for local law enforcement to 
recognize cyber warnings, mitigate impacts, and stop future attacks, they must collaborate with 
the federal government, the private sector, and the intelligence community.  
While cyber threats must first originate in a locality, thereby making local law 
enforcement the first to respond to the incident, the federal government is crucial in providing 
resources and developing intelligence to assist in cyber investigations. In order to combat 
cybercrimes, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), in particular, has taken several steps to 
ensure accurate intelligence, improve technological skills, and build partnerships to share 
developing cyber information (FBI, n.d.).         
 The FBI has developed a cyber division at their Headquarters and has trained cyber 
squads with enhanced cyber skills that will assist in investigating various cybercrimes, including 
theft of personal information and intellectual property and online fraud. The FBI also has Cyber 
Action Teams that consist of cyber experts that travel worldwide to assist in gathering 
intelligence regarding computer intrusion cases that are particularly threatening to the security of 
the United States. The teams contain both agents and computer experts who are trained in 
forensic investigations, malware analysis, and computer language. Growing partnerships allow 
the FBI to leverage resources from other federal agencies as well as local and state law 
enforcement personnel that exhibit situational awareness and retrieve initial information 
regarding an incident (FBI, n.d.).          
 Currently, the FBI’s Cyber Initiative and Resource Fusion Unit (CIRFU) collaborates 
with the National Cyber Forensics and Training Alliance (NCFTA) in order to gather 
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intelligence to combat cybercrimes. The National Cyber Forensics and Training Alliance is a 
forward thinking organization that proactively addresses cybercrimes by coordinating with law 
enforcement, the private sector, and academia sources. By collaborating with this organization, 
the Cyber Initiative and Resource Fusion Unit is able to draw extensive intelligence on cyber 
related threats that stem from sources such as the private sector, the FBI’s Crime Complaint 
Center, and even the Computer Emergency Response Team from Carnegie Mellon University. 
Building such partnerships and establishing intelligence sources allows both the FBI’s CIRFU 
and NCFTA to build strategic and tactical products, as well as threat intelligence analysis, to 
identify and prevent emerging cyber threats (FBI, n.d.).  
In addition to the federal government, private sectors have begun to recognize the 
importance of building alliances to prevent evolving cyber threats. In order to access real time 
threat intelligence to ensure rapid response efforts, cyber security companies have come together 
to form the Cyber Threat Alliance (CTA). Organizations such as Fortinet, McAfee, Symantec, 
and Cisco have developed the alliance to gather intelligence from multiple sources and enhance 
real time response efforts. The alliance focuses on reducing the time to detect a threat, closing 
gaps between the detection and deployment cycle, and developing real time cyber threat 
information sharing among companies in the cybersecurity field. Not only does such information 
help to prevent cyber attacks more rapidly, but sharing the information among the companies 
helps to forewarn one another about potential attacks on their systems so that they can 
immediately respond (Xie, 2018).        
 The aforementioned companies begin their intelligence gathering by establishing a list of 
manufactures, OS versions, and devices to determine what devices and systems may be 
susceptible to exploits and cyber intrusions. After tracking their devices, the companies collect 
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and analyze data such as IoT and multi-cloud devices to develop threat intelligence. They also 
work to constantly update logs to ensure that local data is combined with external intelligence 
needed to gain a full picture of potential cyber threats. Combining data helps to identify 
indicators of cyber vulnerabilities that require speedy response (Xie, 2018).   
 Fusion centers. Fusion centers maintain situational awareness, gather information to 
develop timely and accurate intelligence on impending threats, and share intelligence with 
appropriate partners such as law enforcement officials and the private sector. The 
aforementioned abilities allow fusion centers to effectively detect potential threats so that law 
enforcement can investigate and work to prevent it. Such actions are particularly useful to 
cybercrimes as detecting a cyber-attack in its early stages is crucial to preventing further damage 
such as loss of information or stealing of classified, sensitive data (DOJ, 2015).   
 Integrating the cyber community into fusion centers is extremely valuable in enhancing 
information gathering and sharing abilities among the centers to combat cyberwarfare of all 
kinds. Fusion centers are a valuable asset in cybersecurity in that they are a common source for 
gathering information, such as cybercrime incidents, from multiple partners. Gathering and 
analyzing such information allows the centers to establish patterns or trends from the data that 
they can then share with law enforcement and the cyber community. Cyber communities provide 
fusion centers with information regarding malicious indicators and possible precursors of illegal 
cyber activity. Such information can include potential patterns of malicious activity, Internet 
Protocol (IP) addresses, and information developed on new cyber techniques impacting the 
private sector. They also assist in providing an understanding of raw information such as 
malware code and abnormal computer activity (DOJ, 2015).      
 Some fusion centers host cyber community liaisons as resources to efficient information 
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gathering and sharing capabilities. These personnel tend to exhibit expertise in areas regarding 
industrial control systems and emerging technologies and software systems. They are also 
contacts for resources involving cyber subsectors such as Website hosting companies, Internet 
Service Providers, and mobile platform companies. Fusion centers, in turn, develop relevant 
cyber products including technical, strategic, and tactical developments, that not only assist in 
the cyber community but also law enforcement. Sharing pertinent cyber intelligence allows local 
law enforcement personnel to better prepare for potential threats, such as increased cyber threats 
from China, as analysis completed by the centers gives law enforcement partners the ability to 
plan accordingly (DOJ, 2015). As China continues to support Chinese actors committing 
cybercrimes impacting United States’ facilities, integration and collaboration among local fusion 
centers and local law enforcement is crucial. 
In December 2018, two Chinese actors were indicted for conspiracy to commit wire 
fraud, computer intrusion, and aggravated identity theft. The men, Zhu Hua and Zhang Shilong, 
are members of the Advanced Persistent Threat 10, or APT 10, a hacking group associated to the 
Chinese government. By engaging in spear phishing, the hackers were able to introduce malware 
into targeted computers and subsequently obtain information from said computers. By sending 
emails that appear to be legitimate, the hackers unleashed attachments that installed a program to 
record all keystrokes on the machine, allowing them to obtain usernames and passwords. APT 10 
has conducted several secretive operations where they were able to steal data from numerous 
companies encompassing industries such as finance, manufacturing, and health care (FBI, 2018). 
 The Chinese actors’ abilities to not only commit cyber espionage, but cybercrimes such 
as fraud and identity theft that impact industries in the U.S., require immediate action from local 
fusion centers and local law enforcement to mitigate such crimes. Similar to their tactics for 
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espionage, the Chinese engage in online fraud and identity theft crimes by hacking into computer 
systems, infecting emails through spear phishing, enabling proxies, and influencing social media. 
The Chinese actors’ ability to retrieve classified personal data also allows them to utilize such 
information to craft spear phishing emails and gain access to any computer. They can similarly 
use the accounts to send fake emails claiming to be from colleagues in different facilities 
(Nakashima, 2015). Spear phishing emails affect local businesses, banks, and schools, thus 
requiring the response of local law enforcement and fusion centers. They are the first to respond 
and the first to initiate an investigation into the cyber related crime affecting their community.  
Limitations / Problems 
Based on prior cyber incidents committed by China, as well as continuous advancements 
in technology and intelligence capabilities, it is evident that China is a threat to the United States 
and its intelligence community. Although fusion centers can assist in overcoming cyber threats 
by enhancing intelligence gathering and information sharing regarding cyber threats, there are 
still challenges that they must resolve. While the aforementioned practices contribute to better 
preparation and response efforts regarding cyber threats emanating from China, there are also 
some limitations to combating these threats.  
Education. Collecting information on cyber threats requires significant knowledge and 
understanding of cybercrimes. In order for fusion centers and local law enforcement officials to 
gather information on cybercrimes, they have to possess significant technological skills, 
understand cyber related terms, and undergo training on how to investigate, analyze, and 
preserve such data. Recognizing digital footprints and understanding how different cyber threats, 
such as ransomwares, are delivered is essential. They must also understand phishing and 
spoofing terms in order to identify various cyber fraud crimes as well as recognize emails with 
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potential malware imbedded in them. A lack of education on the part of law enforcement also 
makes it challenging for the private sector to understand the criminal threat. With a continuous 
rise in cybercrimes, law enforcement officials must be able to analyze cyber threats and assess 
their risks, allowing them to provide such information to the private sector (Gercke, 2012).  
 Jurisdictions. Different regional differences cause some concerns for combating 
cybercrimes. Not only do different jurisdictions make it difficult to prosecute hackers, provided 
that they are identified and apprehended in the first place, but it is difficult to coordinate with 
other countries regarding cyber threats. In order to successfully prevent China from cyber 
espionage or attacks, the United States must cooperate with other countries who are allies and 
will aid the U.S. in developing precautions to stop China from committing online crimes. The 
United States cannot gather all the necessary information and intelligence that is needed to 
combat cybercrimes originating from China unless aided and supported by other nations 
(Gercke, 2012).            
 Funding. These aforementioned developments require funding, education, advanced 
technologies, and strategic planning and policy developments. In 2017, focusing on the issue of 
encryption, the Department of Justice requested $21.6 million from the federal budget. The 
Department of Justice requested the funds in order to acquire new, advanced tools for analyzing 
encrypted electronic devices as well as develop and expand various in-house expertise. Funding 
required for cybersecurity appears to be continuously increasing. Further additions such as 
advanced education and training only add to those costs and create a rather heavy burden on the 
economy. Even agencies that are well funded may find challenges in acquiring the necessary 
budget to allot for hiring technology experts, training officers in cybercrimes and updated 
software systems, and developing and implementing cybercrime prevention policies and 
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regulations. Rapidly evolving cyber threats make it extremely challenging for the U.S. economy 
to keep up and continue to ensure cybersecurity (Police Executive Research Forum, 2018). 
Conclusion            
 The staggering change and developments in the cyber world have caused the need for the 
United States to recognize new cyber-related threats impacting society. As the use of the Internet 
grows and expands, so do the crimes that take place in cyberspace. The easy access and 
availability, as well as anonymity, behind the Internet allows hackers, terrorists, and different 
nation states to take advantage of the cyber realm. Such abilities have created a significant shift 
from physical crimes to cybercrimes that are predominantly difficult to detect, trace, investigate, 
and respond to.          
 China, in particular, has utilized the expansion of the Internet to their benefit. Already 
involved in numerous espionage incidents in the United States from past events, China has 
sought to develop their cyber abilities to improve their spying opportunities on the United States. 
While China tends to focus on private sector companies and stealing their new ideas related to 
superior technologies, there is also the concern that China is building such capabilities to secure 
a strong military as well as steal personal data on Americans and intelligence from the American 
government.            
 As China continues their developments, it is crucial for the United States to foster 
intelligence gathering and information sharing among law enforcement partners and the private 
sector. The private sector is often impacted from such cyber incidents attacking their critical 
infrastructure and companies’ innovations. Law enforcement has the ability to provide 
knowledge on the cyber threat and investigate. Combining these efforts is crucial to preventing 
major cyber-attacks. Advanced intelligence gathering and sharing to prevent the attacks can be 
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developed through the use of fusion centers as they provide situational awareness, develop 
timely and accurate intelligence, and share cyber related threats among law enforcement 
personnel and the private sector. Combining resources and efforts among fusion centers to 
combat cybercrimes will assist in better identifying, mitigating, and preventing cyber threats 
from China impacting the United States.  
The next chapter, Chapter 9, will address technology and critical infrastructure 
protection. It will specifically focus on the relevance of the information technology sector and its 
relation to local fusion centers as well as the importance of protecting the sector from criminal 
and terrorist threats. Chapter 9 will also offer ways to enhance security for the sector and reduce 
risks. 
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Chapter 9: Technology and Critical Infrastructure Protection 
Introduction 
Critical infrastructure includes various assets, networks, and systems that provide for 
everyday functions and activities of the United States. The critical infrastructure sectors are 
considered so vital to the operations of the United States that a negative impact on any one of 
them would have a devastating effect on the safety of the people and security of America (DHS, 
2018a). Because the sectors affect essential operations and functions provided by the United 
States, they also impact fusion centers and their abilities to detect and prevent threats. In order to 
ensure fusion centers can perform their daily functions, it is essential to protect critical 
infrastructure sectors that fusion centers rely upon to operate.   
Critical Infrastructure Sectors  
There are a total of 16 critical infrastructure sectors. The sectors include chemical, 
commercial facilities, communications, critical manufacturing, dams, defense industrial base, 
emergency services, energy, financial services, food and agriculture, government facilities, 
healthcare and public health, information technology, nuclear reactors, materials, and waste, 
transportation systems, and water and wastewater systems. These sectors are essential to the 
national security, national public health and safety, and national economic security of the United 
States (DHS, 2018a). 
While all critical infrastructures are vital for the safety and security of the country, the 
information technology (IT) sector is a rather significant infrastructure in today’s society as 
numerous businesses, companies, government facilities, and citizens rely greatly on the sector. 
The information technology sector provides both hardware and software services and, along with 
the communications sector, produces the Internet. Without successful functionality of the sector, 
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numerous facilities and their operations may fail, thus affecting the economy. Without the 
infrastructure, a lack of daily communications that citizens rely on through Wi-Fi and the 
Internet may lead to panic. Most importantly, government facilities that operate under advanced 
information technology systems may be compromised, thus threatening security and safety of the 
public (DHS, 2017b).  
While impacted by several critical infrastructure sectors such as communications and 
energy, local fusion centers and their operations rely greatly on the information technology 
sector and are directly impacted by its functions. Through computers and other hardware 
products, fusion centers utilize software systems and databases to gather, store, retrieve, and 
share information (DOJ, 2009). As a result, in order for fusion centers to effectively gather and 
share such information, the information technology infrastructure must be protected and 
defended from any threats that could compromise or destroy its functions and capabilities.  
Information technology assets. In order for the information technology critical 
infrastructure to remain secure, it is important to protect its critical nodes and links. Critical 
nodes are the sector’s most valuable assets that if compromised or threatened in any way could 
severely harm the overall operations and functions of the sector. In addition to the critical nodes, 
the critical links demonstrate the connection between the assets. In some sectors, it would require 
several assets to be negatively impacted in order for the sector to drastically be affected. In 
others, however, the threat or negative impact on just one critical node could have severe 
repercussions on the sector (Dhurde & Deshpande, 2014). 
Hardware products and software systems. Hardware products and software systems 
are the critical nodes of the IT sector as they allow the sector to perform its operations. Hardware 
products consist of items such as computers, ipads, smartphones, hard drives, routers, firewall 
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hardware, and more. Such items are essential to the information technology sector as they are the 
physical products that allow access to software systems, databases, and the Internet. Software 
systems, on the other hand, include operating and application systems that provide the ability to 
perform certain, specific tasks. Examples of software systems include Microsoft Office and 
Internet browsers such as Safari and Google Chrome. Additionally, the software systems allow 
for the creation of databases that gather, store, retrieve, and share information (IT Infrastructure, 
2013).  
Both the hardware products and software systems of the information technology sector 
greatly rely on one another. The negative impact on one asset has the potential to affect the other 
asset and cause a significant failure to the sector. Without the hardware products such as 
computers and ipads, there would be no way to access the software systems, databases, or the 
Internet. Similarly, without access to the software systems and databases to collect, retrieve, or 
share information, the hardware products would remain useless. Both critical nodes must be 
protected to ensure that information technology remains secure and that a catastrophic failure 
does not occur (IT Infrastructure, 2013).  
Information technology threats. Because the information technology sector supports 
the United States’ every day functions, it is vital to ensure that the critical nodes of the 
information technology sector are protected against threats. Some threats include both cyber and 
physical attacks. Cyber-attacks include any harmful act conducted in cyber space in the attempt 
to dismantle or destroy a computer system or network. Cyber-attacks are particularly threatening 
to the information technology sector as the critical infrastructure relies almost solely on the 
Internet and computer systems to perform their everyday activities. A cyber-attack on the sector 
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would severely impact its software systems, and databases, thus impacting the entire sector’s 
functions (Fisher, 2016). 
Cyber-attacks. Cyber-attacks are often performed by hackers with the intent of either 
stealing, distributing, or destroying classified information. Because fusion centers often gather 
and share vital, classified intelligence, an attack on their software systems would cause a breach 
in security. Similarly, years of intelligence from wide-scale operations could be compromised or 
potentially destroyed from a cyber-attack. Such attacks even have the potential to be deployed by 
internal threats, whereby individuals already have the skills, due to training, to complete cyber-
attacks. In addition to hackers, terrorists may have an interest in attacking through cyberspace. A 
negative impact on the Internet or Wi-Fi would result in people not being able to communicate 
with one another. Additionally, companies and facilities that operate through technological 
systems would shut down and be negatively impacted economically (Fisher, 2016). Such 
repercussions can result in public fear and panic. 
Physical attacks. In addition to cyber-attacks, physical attacks may also take place. 
Physical attacks will often harm the hardware products in fusion centers that allow for the 
utilization of software systems and databases. Such instances can stem from terrorism, through 
the physical attacks of companies or government facilities that host numerous hardware services 
in their buildings, thus destroying them. The attacks may also stem from natural disasters that 
cause damage and destruction to homes, businesses, institutions, and many more that operate 
with hardware products. Just as with software systems, any drastic impact on the hardware 
products alone could cause damage to the entire IT sector (IT Infrastructure, 2013).  
Although both cyber and physical attacks have the potential to develop serious 
consequences for the operations of the information technology sector, cyber-attacks have a much 
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greater probability of occurring than physical attacks. Cyber-attacks are often successfully 
accomplished because of the level of advancements that society has reached in regard to the 
cyber world. Hackers can now hack systems at an accelerated speed and break through firewalls 
seamlessly and without detection. In addition, terrorists can utilize IT to their benefits by 
reaching out to young, impressionable individuals for recruitment through social media. Such 
easy access to the online world has not only made gathering supporters significantly easier for 
terrorists, but it has allowed them to spread their ideologies all over the world. Lastly, cyber-
attacks can be accomplished quickly and quietly. In some instances, companies, institutions, or 
government facilities will not know that they have been hacked or compromised until it is too 
late and their systems have been breached (Weimann, 2004). Such stealthily operations are 
particularly concerning for the IT sector and fusion centers. 
Risk-Based Resource Allocation  
 In order to disrupt threats to the information technology infrastructure, countermeasures 
to protect the sector must be developed. Such countermeasures can be developed through the 
apportioned risk reduction method. The apportioned risk reduction includes spreading available 
resources and funds across as many threats to the sector as possible. This, in turn, helps to reduce 
the risk to all potential threats to the sector (Lewis, 2006).  
Security measures. In order to protect the sector, security measures should be checked 
on, as well as advanced, constantly and consistently. Security systems must be monitored at all 
times to ensure that they are functioning and that they have not been compromised. They should 
also be updated often. If the security systems remain the same, it becomes easier for the attackers 
to recognize the current system and locate potential weak spots where they can penetrate the 
system. Constantly monitoring and building security efficiency and performance helps to avoid 
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complacency, which would otherwise make it extremely easy for attackers to initiate their plans 
and successfully attack. Similarly, updating and reviewing emergency plans, should an attack 
take place, will help to build procedures to fix current security flaws (Vulnerability Assessment, 
2001).            
 Training. It is also important to retain personnel that are highly advanced in technology 
and cyber skills. Not only should their skills be proficient, but they must be able to recognize 
threats early on. Whether it be a virus spreading throughout the networks or hackers stealing 
classified information, it is essential that the IT security personnel recognize warning signs early 
on. If the attack cannot be prevented, then at least early recognition will ensure that there is not 
complete destruction or loss of information or intelligence. They should also be able to recognize 
emails or links that may contain viruses that are harmful to their servers. Such superior skills can 
be developed through advanced training programs that focus on topics such as hacking, viruses, 
failure of software systems, as well as ways to prevent and respond to such incidents. The 
programs should essentially develop experts in the evolving information technology sector where 
the personnel supporting United States government facilities can begin to surpass the skills of 
hackers (Vulnerability Assessment, 2001). 
 Information sharing. Lastly, it is essential to forewarn other centers and agencies should 
a cyber-attack take place, especially in local fusion centers. If fusion centers are able to 
recognize the initial stages of a cyber-attack in their center, they must caution other agencies 
about a potential attack on their systems. The centers gather and develop their intelligence by 
sharing information with other centers and agencies. They also share several databases where the 
information is stored and shared (DHS, 2017c). Should the information in one center be 
compromised by a cyber-attack, then other centers may be impacted as well. Collaborating with 
99 
INFORMATION SHARING: LOCAL FUSION CENTERS  
 
other fusion centers to prepare for and prevent cyber-attacks will assist in disrupting further 
damage to the centers and protect important, classified information that each has gathered and 
shared over periods of time.    
Redundancies. In the event that a cyber-attack does take place, response plans must be in 
place. If fusion centers fall victim to a cyber-attack, the centers must look towards their federal 
partners to provide them with the necessary resources and funds to restore their operations as 
quickly as possible (DHS, 2017c). Additionally, the center must collaborate with the Multi-State 
Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC). MS-ISAC is a facility designed as a key 
resource for cyber threat prevention, response, and recovery for the country’s local, state, tribal, 
and territorial partners. Designated as a cyber-resource by DHS, the facility serves local fusion 
centers and can greatly assist in response efforts in the event of a cyber-attack. Composed of 
security experts, the center’s Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) also provides 
malware analysis, malicious code analysis and mitigation, computer and network forensics, and 
incident response. Fusion centers can report incidents ranging from unauthorized access to 
intelligence, compromised passwords, execution of viruses or malware, and more. CERT 
responds with forensic analysis, reverse engineering, threat intelligence, and mitigation and 
response efforts (Multi-State Information Sharing & Analysis Center, n.d.). 
 Budget. Protection for hardware products and software systems in fusion centers requires 
sufficient funding and grants from the Department of Homeland Security. Specifically, the 
centers are often funded by the Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) that helps to ensure 
equipment for core capabilities for operations and security for the facilities. The program 
consists of the State Homeland Security Program, the Urban Area Security Initiative, and 
Operation Stonegarden. Combined, these programs fund the necessary equipment that fusion 
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centers request in order to strengthen their abilities and their overall missions (DHS, 2018c). 
 In order for fusion centers to request funds for their hardware products and software 
system, they must comply with several rules. The requests regarding the investments should 
reference the specific performance areas that the funding is intended to support or reasons why 
the funding is requested and deemed necessary for the centers. Additionally, all centers in 
different jurisdictions should be able to utilize the requested funds. The funds should support 
various centers and their activities in intelligence gathering and sharing. Local fusion centers 
seeking the funds must ensure that efforts in support of the centers’ initiatives are integrated and 
coordinated with other fusion centers (DHS, 2018c). 
 Fiscal year. Accompanying the fiscal year 2018 Appropriation for the Department of 
Homeland Security, Congress expressed that the Secretary must fund up to 85 percent of the 
nationwide risk. As a result, the Secretary designated 32 urban areas that were eligible for such 
funds under the Urban Area Security Initiative. One of the facilities eligible for the funds 
included fusion centers as Congress found it necessary to utilize the funds for the centers in order 
to prioritize cybersecurity projects and technological integration and capabilities to assist in 
managing emerging threats (DHS, n.d.).         
 While several other groups and facilities were allotted funds from the Urban Area 
Security Initiative (UASI), overall the program received approximately $580,000,000 in 2018 to 
share with each group and put towards their efforts (FEMA, 2018). Depending on how much of 
the funds the other recipients of the program require for their initiatives, fusion centers have the 
ability to utilize the allotted budget from the Initiative to support their technological 
advancements and security systems for their operations (DHS, n.d.). 
The allotted budget for the centers must be split to support both the hardware products 
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and the software systems. As previously mentioned, the apportioned risk reduction takes the 
given budget and spreads it evenly among the critical nodes of the infrastructure in order to 
protect the sector’s assets and reduce the risks to all possible threats (Lewis, 2006). The budget 
can be used for costs of new computer systems or additional iPad as well as advanced software 
systems and anti-virus and anti-malware systems for the centers. Databases can be expanded to 
store vast amounts of information and technological advancements can be made to ensure that 
systems are interoperable among various agencies. Backup systems may also be developed and 
implemented in the event of an attack. Lastly, the budget can assist in training purposes so that 
analysts and law enforcement individuals who work in fusion centers are trained in advanced 
information technology systems. While the budget may fluctuate from year to year, the goal is to 
show the importance of fusion centers and the functions of their IT critical nodes so that they can 
receive the highest budget possible to continue to advance their systems to defend against any 
cyber-attacks (DHS, n.d.).  
Conclusion  
 In order to protect and secure the information technology sector, it is necessary to protect 
its hardware products and software systems as harm to these assets could have potential dire 
consequences to the sector and its functions (IT Infrastructure, 2013). This is particularly true for 
fusion centers that operate through software systems and databases to store, retrieve, and share 
vital information. Based on the centers’ use of technology, software systems, and databases, 
there is a high probability that threats will emanate from cyber-attacks, rather than physical. As a 
result, it is important to strengthen security measures, retain personnel that are highly advanced 
in technology and cyber skills, and forewarn other centers and agencies should a cyber-attack 
begin to take place.            
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 Chapter 10 will discuss the benefits of multidisciplinary approaches to homeland 
security. More specifically, it will address how fusion centers can also assist in all hazards by 
collaborating and coordinating with several different disciplines.  
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Chapter 10: Multidisciplinary Approaches to Homeland Security 
Introduction 
In order to enhance collaborative efforts of fusion centers, it is vital to adopt 
multidisciplinary approaches. Multidisciplinary approaches include integrating numerous 
disciplines into a collective community to build successful homeland security plans (Wyckoff, 
2015). While fusion centers often collaborate with law enforcement personnel, they should also 
cooperate with varying disciplines in emergency management. Although fusion centers primarily 
assist in criminal and terrorism-related incidents, their abilities to function as a conduit for 
information sharing may prove to be beneficial for all types of hazards (Harris, 2008). 
While disciplines such as police, fire, emergency management personnel, health 
providers, etc. often maintain different resources, roles, and responsibilities, they share similar 
goals in seeking to prepare for, mitigate, and prevent manmade events and natural disasters. 
Because several disciplines become involved in emergencies, fusion centers can assist in 
emergency management by sharing information with responders. In order to do so, fusion centers 
and the various disciplines must come together to strengthen collaborative efforts.  
Emergency Preparedness and Response  
 The emergency management cycle can guide fusion centers and various disciplines to 
build collaborative plans and practices for emergency management. The emergency management 
cycle contains essential activities that all partners must follow in order to prepare for and respond 
to an incident. More specifically, the cycle is comprised of planning, organizing, gathering 
equipment, training, exercising, and evaluating and improving.   
 Emergency management cycle. Planning involves the collection and analysis of 
information as well as the development of procedures. It allows the stakeholders to learn their 
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roles, as well as others, in the plan and determine capability requirements early on. This greatly 
aids in shortening the time required to gain control of an adverse event. Organizing is the process 
of strengthening leadership at each level and developing an organizational structure where 
responders can work together more efficiently. In order to practice the developed plan and 
perform assigned tasks, it is important to acquire various equipment, supplies, and systems. 
Analysts, law enforcement personnel assigned to fusion centers, and other disciplines must be 
able to share commonly understood resources when responding to a severe incident. Training 
prepares the partners with the training and assets to accomplish their goals. Exercising includes 
practicing the plans that have been developed. Testing the plans with all partners aids in 
determining whether they may be successful or not. Lastly, evaluating and improving complete 
the emergency management cycle. Evaluating strategies helps to identify what is working 
successfully as well as any deficiencies that may exist in the plans. Whether or not the plan is 
considered successful, it is important to always continue improving and developing specific 
recommendations for changes in practices (DHS, 2008).  
Whole Community and Mega-Communities Concepts  
 A whole community consists of different disciplines, such as emergency management 
personnel, government officials, the private sector, and the public, collectively assessing the 
needs of their communities to strengthen their capacities (FEMA, 2011). In order to strengthen 
the communities’ capacities, the whole community can build a megacommunity and collaborate 
together. Megacommunities include various disciplines, such as law enforcement, fire, medical 
services, public health, emergency management, and leaders within them, coming together to 
work towards common goals (DHS, 2008). Megacommunities also acknowledge the importance 
of incorporating businesses, government, and civil society in the relationship. Developing such 
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open-ended networks where disciplines can learn from one another, share resources, and develop 
partnerships is what strengthens their approaches to homeland security strategies. Integrating the 
disciplines into a megacommunity develops greater emergency management planning, 
communication pathways, and resilience (Gerencser, Van Lee, Napolitano, & Kelly, 2008). 
Fusion centers benefit from forming a megacommunity in that they are able to better 
collaborate with different partners to gather and share information in a timely manner. Sharing 
such information in a timely fashion helps to detect threats in an expedited time frame, catch 
suspects before they commit further crimes, dismantle potential criminal or terrorist operations, 
and potentially assist in emergencies, such as natural disasters, by providing information to 
response teams. Additionally, while several disciplines retain different tasks such as gathering 
and sharing information, caretaking and providing services to victims, or organizing response 
plans, they all share similar goals in preventing or mitigating adverse incidents. Developing a 
megacommunity with fusion center personnel and various disciplines allows the groups to better 
collaborate as a team. 
Partnerships. Fostering partnerships among the different disciplines helps to increase 
collaborative efforts among fusion centers. Partnerships assist in strengthening cooperation 
among the disciplines to improve preparedness and response methods. While each discipline 
often maintains their own roles, tasks, and resources, they all tend to have a level of dependency 
on one another. Without cooperation among them, it would be extremely difficult to ensure the 
best possible results for otherwise adverse events.  
Fusion centers coordinate with various partners, including local, state, tribal, and federal 
levels through the receipt, analysis, gathering, and sharing of threat-related information (DHS, 
2017d). In an adverse incident, the local level initiates the response as they maintain situational 
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awareness in their community. Within the community, local fire, emergency services, public 
health, police, and several other responders are usually the first to respond to an incident as well 
as the last to leave the site. Additionally, the state assists the local level in their abilities as they 
provide resources to them. The tribal level also often requests the states’ varying resources and 
assistance when needed. Federal partners contribute to domestic incidents and regularly maintain 
several operations by supporting fusion centers and their initiatives. For example, fusion centers 
often collaborate with local FBI joint terrorism task forces where they can utilize federal 
government resources and share homeland security information (DHS, 2016). Similarly, fusion 
centers support the federal government by providing them with critical state and local 
intelligence and subject matter expertise (DHS, 2018b). Non-governmental facilities also aid in 
response measures by acquiring local volunteers, providing emergency services such as food and 
water, and implementing search and rescue (Course Overview, n.d.). 
Lastly, the private sector has become a major influence in multidisciplinary approaches, 
including collaborating with fusion centers. Private sector partners are typically the first to detect 
precursor criminal or terrorist activity. Developing a strong partnership among the private sector 
and fusion centers assists both government and industry decision makers in better understanding, 
detecting, preparing for, and responding to emerging threats while also aiding in reducing risks 
to the community (DHS, 2014). The private sector also has resources, such as specialized experts 
and equipment, in varying disciplines that can greatly assist in response and recovery efforts. 
Private sector partners help to restore infrastructure and they participate in both state and local 
preparedness activities (Course Overview, n.d.), helping to mitigate repercussions in 
emergencies.            
 Partnerships also build trust, making it easier to communicate and work with one another. 
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Within the Federal Bureau of Investigation, there is an organization called the Office of Private 
Sector. The Office of Private Sector partners with the FBI in order to develop organized and 
coordinated approaches to engagement with the private sector. The operations of the office 
include enhancing the FBI’s understanding of the risks and needs of the private sector as well as 
increasing information sharing between the private sector and the bureau. The overall goal of the 
office is to mitigate threats through long-lasting, mutually beneficial partnerships between the 
federal government and the private sector (DOJ, n.d.b).  
The office has also developed a group called The Domestic Security Advisory Council. 
The Domestic Security Advisory Council (DSAC) is an information sharing and security 
initiative between the FBI, the private sector, and the Department of Homeland Security. DSAC 
enables effective communication and information sharing in order to investigate threats that 
impact, specifically, American businesses. The council supports the private sector by advancing 
their capabilities to protect their assets, infrastructure, employees, and proprietary information. 
Essentially, the council also helps to bridge the gap that exists between fusion centers and the 
private sector. Because the FBI often partners with fusion centers, DSAC’s inclusion within the 
FBI gives them some access to information sharing between local fusion centers. It is these types 
of partnerships that allow for mutually beneficial strategies and outcomes for fusion centers and 
their abilities to assist in emergencies (DOJ, n.d.a).  
Dialogue. One of the best methods to utilize when seeking to build partnerships and 
encourage multidisciplinary approaches is dialogue. Dialogue is a form of conversation that 
supports moving past one individual’s understanding and perspective to build collective meaning 
and community. Through collaborative meetings with one another, dialogue should be enforced 
in fusion centers so that each partner can share and learn different perspectives. The practice of 
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dialogue allows for new understandings, creative ideas, shared leadership, and a community-
based culture of cooperation among the partners collaborating with fusion centers. Dialogue is an 
effective means of establishing multidisciplinary approaches to homeland security in that it 
moves the disciplines from their cultures of dependency, competition, and exclusion to increased 
efforts in collaboration, partnerships, and inclusion. The disciplines can still retain their ability to 
share their strengths and ideas while allowing others to learn and integrate multiple different 
perspectives (A Brief Orientation to Dialogue, 2006).  
In order to build dialogue in the megacommunity, targeted forums are valuable initiatives 
that can be particularly beneficial for fusion centers. Targeted forums include large, cross-sector 
conferences where various personnel come together for several days to discuss and collaborate 
on a specific topic. This process teaches personnel how to work with one another, thus fostering 
collective action. It helps them develop contacts for future collaborative projects. It also builds 
trust among the partners and encourages open discussions for different ideas. Because fusion 
centers acquire their intelligence through information sharing with different partners, a sense of 
trust and cooperation are essential qualities that the partners must exude. The partners must be 
comfortable enough with other disciplines and partners to constantly and consistently reach out 
and share information. Prolonged meetings, such as the targeted forums, will assist in developing 
such elements, thus supporting both the fusion centers’ objectives and the overall 
megacommunity (Gerencser et al., 2008). 
 Leaders. In order to instill a megacommunity, it is essential to ensure that there are 
leaders with certain attributes that allow the megacommunity to flourish and remain 
longstanding. Namely, there are ten important key elements to becoming a successful leader in a 
megacommunity. These ten qualities include a spirit of inclusiveness, tri-sector exposure, a non-
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imperial approach, navigation skills, communication skills, technological savvy, adaptability, the 
talent to foster talent, presence and passion, and long-term thinking (Gerencser et al., 2008).  
 Inclusiveness not only applies to the megacommunity participants but also to the citizens 
who stand to benefit from disciplines collaborating to ensure safety and security. A tri-sector 
exposure is dependent upon a leader having experience in all three sectors including business, 
government, and civil sectors. Their familiarity with the aforementioned sectors and their 
responsibilities will assist in integrating the different disciplines into the megacommunity. A 
non-imperial approach ensures that a leader is not overbearing, but rather supports the groups in 
their work production. Navigation and communication skills involve creating pathways to 
strengthening collaboration, inventing strategies that work for all, and listening and speaking to 
everyone in the process effectively. Technological savvy and adaptability ensure that the leader 
grows in knowledge as advancements continue and are able to progress from such technological 
innovations. Leaders must also bring about each sector’s talent and continue to encourage their 
most valuable qualities and capabilities. Additionally, presence and passion will support such 
talents as the leaders’ passion for their responsibilities and the goals they seek to acquire will 
also encourage the partners involved. Lastly, long term thinking is essential in reaching the 
megacommunity’s goals. It creates sustainability where the partners in the megacommunity 
begin to become invested in the megacommunity process as well as committed to ensuring that 
their shared goals in homeland security are accomplished (Gerencser et al., 2008). While it may 
be difficult to acquire leaders with all of these ten valuable assets, leaders should strive to 
possess such strong qualities to ensure that they maintain the megacommunity.   
Community resilience. One of the valuable qualities of fusion centers is that they have 
close ties to the community and locality that they are based in, making them extremely beneficial 
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in supporting community resilience against threats. A resilient community entails an engaged 
local community, partnerships among different organizations, integration of preparedness and 
response plans, and partnerships with state and federal government (Chandra et al., 2011). For 
this reason, it is important that fusion centers sustain a megacommunity as they heavily support 
other disciplines by allowing them this pathway to information from the local community.  
Emerging Security Technologies  
 As society continues to advance in technology, a common threat that faces the country 
are cyber threats. These types of threats are particularly concerning for fusion centers since the 
centers are surrounded by technology as they utilize different hardware products and databases to 
store, retrieve, and share information (DHS, 2017c). In order to remain ahead of these potential 
threats, fusion centers collaborate with the cyber community. Often cyber community personnel 
may be staffed in the centers, acting as analysts or IT liaisons. These personnel remain aware of 
emerging security technologies that can assist in detecting and preventing threats. Additionally, 
they have contacts within the federal, state, local, tribal, territorial (FSLTT), and private sector 
cyber community that act as resources for providing valuable intelligence on cybersecurity and 
cybercrime as well as the development of advanced hardware, software, and emerging 
technologies. Cyber personnel also assist in providing detection, mitigation, and recovery 
activities as they can assist law enforcement personnel with a variety of surveillance and 
prosecution capabilities. They share risk information on suspicious activity or cyber indicators 
with fusion centers. Such a partnership with the cyber community allows fusion centers to better 
prepare for and respond to adverse cyber threats that could otherwise potentially cause numerous 
security concerns for the country (DOJ, 2015). 
Conclusion        
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 Fusion centers rely on collaborating with different partners to gather and share threat-
related information (DHS, 2018a). It is through the integration and cooperation between the 
partners that the centers can share information to detect, mitigate, and prevent manmade 
incidents. Additionally, the centers have the potential to assist in all hazards and emergency 
management (Harris, 2008). Coordinating with disciplines such as police, fire, public health, and 
emergency management allows the centers to become part of a megacommunity that integrates 
these partners’ efforts to prepare for and prevent emergencies. Such collaboration helps to 
integrate different skills and gather and share information in a timely fashion, thus building 
community resilience and security of the country.  
 Chapter 11 will include public health and pandemic issues and their relation to fusion 
centers. It will address current public health challenges as well as how to prepare for and respond 
to them.  
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Chapter 11: Public Health and Pandemic Issues 
Introduction 
As threats to public health expand, there is a need to better prepare for, respond to, and 
recover from such incidents. Fusion centers remain in a position where they can assist in such 
activities by sharing data and collaborating with various public health agencies, law enforcement 
personnel, and response teams in emergencies. By strengthening fusion centers’ efforts to 
coordinate with public health, they can share data and provide strategic and tactical information 
that will contribute to mitigating public health incidents such as weapons of mass destruction, 
explosives, and pandemics. 
Scope and Complexities of Public Health Challenges 
 Public health threats often stem from different sources. Some emanate from terrorist 
threats through biological, chemical, radiological, and nuclear agents, or explosives. Others stem 
from naturally occurring incidents such as influenza pandemics. While such health concerns may 
originate from various sources such as manmade, natural, or accidental, most overlap in that they 
result in similar challenges and adverse repercussions (U.S. Government Publishing Office, 
2008). 
Weapons of mass destruction. Weapons of mass destruction, including biological, 
chemical, radiological, and nuclear agents, remain as one of the greatest risks to the national 
security of the United States. Such agents in the possession of adversaries, hostile states, or 
terrorists, have the potential to cause significant damage to the country. An attack utilizing these 
weapons of mass destruction could result in critical infrastructure failure, economic instability, 
and mass casualties. Not only do they have the potential to inflict harm in the United States, but 
they can cause injury to military forces abroad (GPO, 2008). 
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Explosives. Similar to weapons of mass destruction, explosives may be created and 
planted by terrorists in an attempt to instill fear and cause mass casualties. Terrorists targeting 
passenger concentrations at airports by transporting explosives through unsecured air 
transportation routes remains as a serious threat. The potential of the use of explosives remains 
high as terrorists often retain the necessary technological skills to make them as well as the 
ability to obtain the components for improvised explosive devices. In addition to the numerous 
deaths that can result from the initial blast of explosives, radioactive particles can spread 
thereafter, impacting even more lives and the health of the public (GPO, 2008). 
Pandemics. Unlike terrorist threats, pandemics are naturally-occurring incidents that can 
negatively affect public health. Pandemics are widespread outbreaks of infectious disease that 
significantly impact morbidity and mortality rates over a wide geographic area. As time 
continues, pandemics appear to be increasing in frequency largely due to emerging viral diseases 
from animals. Greater exploitation of the natural environment and increased global integration 
and travel contribute to the increase as well. While pandemics can stem from several different 
diseases, influenza is most likely to cause a massive pandemic and complicate the health of large 
populations (Madhav et al., 2017). Contagious diseases such as influenza pandemics spread 
rather easily and rapidly, causing a vast amount of people to be infected and even more to panic 
and become fearful that they, too, will become infected (GPO, 2008).  
 Challenges. In addition to many hospitals already struggling to manage the volume of 
patients who require care on a daily basis, the aforementioned emergencies cause greater issues. 
Public health emergencies tend to result in medical surges and a drastic increase in patients in 
hospitals needing immediate care. Paramedics often have to wait for extended periods of time 
before patient care can be transferred to the hospital staff. An overflow of patients and high 
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occupancy leads to patients being treated in emergency department hallways where they may be 
held for hours before they can be placed in an inpatient bed. Transferring patients to alternative 
care sites can be difficult due to the personnel, equipment, and time that is needed to do so. 
Damage to infrastructure in the event of an emergency may also impede responders’ abilities to 
transfer patients. A lack of disaster preparedness and response education for most medical and 
nursing school curricula also contributes to the difficulty of ensuring better response efforts to 
public health emergencies (Department of Health and Human Services, n.d.). 
Additionally, maintaining enough resources and personnel in hospitals and public health 
facilities that can assist in major incidents is a challenge. In the event of an emergency, there are 
often shortages of supplies and essential equipment as many facilities in a given area use the 
same suppliers for back-up stock and medical supplies. Hospitals generally face shortages in 
personnel, but during emergencies such as terrorist attacks or natural disasters, such shortages 
are only exacerbated. Nurses, doctors, and public health professionals have their own personal 
family responsibilities that they must attend to in such incidents. They, themselves, may also 
have been severely impacted or harmed by the adverse event. Others may simply be afraid to 
respond during a disaster due to personal safety concerns (Department of Health and Human 
Services, n.d.). 
Communication failure is a constant, recurring theme often seen during and immediately 
after a disaster. Emergency response involves numerous different disciplines including fire, 
police, public health, emergency management, EMS, and more. These disciplines must be able to 
collaborate effectively to prevent further injuries and save lives, yet it is challenging to develop a 
communications system that is interoperable among all public safety disciplines as well as public 
volunteers. It is also difficult to ensure enough resources, such as radio or satellite phones, for 
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communication purposes especially if there may be an overflow of personnel assisting in the 
disaster. Without effective preparedness plans that incorporate clear roles and responsibilities 
among public health professionals, public safety personnel, and volunteers, it is nearly 
impossible to mitigate an emergency (Department of Health and Human Services, n.d.). For 
example, a lack of preparedness for the wide-scale attack of 9/11, impeded effective decision-
making from command structures. Lack of effective preparedness for the magnitude of the 
incident, number of responders needed, and plans to collaborate with countless public safety 
personnel hampered some response efforts. Senior leaders could not reach other officials and 
some did not enter the chain of command until after the morning’s attacks due to the inability to 
efficiently communicate (Summary of Final Report, 2014). 
In order to ensure effective communication and efficient response efforts among different 
public safety disciplines, emergency departments support numerous responsibilities. The 
emergency department in hospitals is the primary site were initial information regarding a 
disaster is communicated. The emergency department is there to determine the extent of the 
disaster so that they can ascertain how best to respond to it. The department is responsible for 
handling various, different disasters and making timely and accurate response decisions such as 
initiating an institutional lockdown, determining if recipient victim decontamination is needed, 
and declaring an institutional disaster. Their abilities to retrieve initial information, make 
decisions regarding response procedures, and share the information with the regional emergency 
operations center and hospitals are crucial to mitigating an emergency (Department of Health 
and Human Services, n.d.). 
Fusion centers. Much like the roles of emergency departments involving information 
gathering and decision making, fusion centers also support information gathering and sharing. As 
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threats regarding public health emanate, the importance of intelligence and sharing such 
information becomes crucial in better preparing for and responding to such adverse incidents. 
Due to their unique situational awareness, fusion centers can assist public health officials in 
identifying, mitigating, and preventing various threats to public health (Barishansky & 
Komansky, 2014).          
 Fusion centers have begun to expand their capabilities to an all-hazards approach with a 
focus on developing partnerships with various disciplines. Public health officials can offer fusion 
centers strategic and tactical information such as crime-related trends, response capabilities, and 
suspicious activities related to health. Local and state public health officials often provide public 
health intelligence such as communicable disease trends, environmental health findings, 
surveillance observations of critical symptoms, and private healthcare-capacity such as medical 
surges. In return, fusion centers develop analytic products outlining potential causes for concern 
that they may identify from such information, utilize their surveillance capabilities, and use their 
detection tools to better collaborate with different disciplines including homeland security and 
first responder partners. Fusion centers have the ability to recognize patterns, detect connections, 
and develop accurate intelligence. They can bring together expertise from distinct areas of the 
emergency services community to ensure timely and efficient preparedness, response, and 
recovery efforts to various health threats (Barishansky & Komansky, 2014). 
Policy, Strategic, and Ethical Issues Related to Preparedness and Response 
Public health concerns including weapons of mass destruction, explosives, and 
pandemics are not considered new threats as these threats have previously impacted the United 
States. Past incidents have greatly compromised the health of the public while also causing 
significant building damage, economic loss, and mass casualties.   
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Weapons of mass destruction. In 2001, B. anthracis spores, also known as anthrax, were 
sent through the United States postal system in a bioterrorist attack. A public health investigation 
was first implemented when an infectious disease physician recognized a potential case of 
inhalation anthrax in a patient hospitalized in Florida. The diagnosis was soon confirmed by 
Florida’s Department of Health (FDH) as well as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC). As the investigation continued, various victims of possible anthrax exposure turned up in 
different areas of the country including Manhattan and New Jersey. Symptoms of inhalational 
anthrax in New Jersey postal workers appeared and the workers were subsequently diagnosed 
with anthrax exposure. Another individual staffed in the Hart Senate Office Building opened a 
letter that contained a powder substance along with a note identifying the substance as anthrax. 
Nasal swab tests were performed on hundreds of senate staff members and visitors to the 
building, resulting in 28 victims being exposed to anthrax. Through further investigation and 
analysis, the CDC was able to link four confirmed cases of anthrax as a result of intentional 
delivery through mailed letters or packages. The 2001 anthrax attack resulted in 22 people 
developing anthrax due to the mailings, 11 suffering from the inhalational of the substance, and 5 
of them dying (Gursky, Inglesby, & O’Toole, 2003).  
Explosives. Leading up to 9/11, there were several attacks by terrorists seeking to 
eliminate numerous Americans and cause severe destruction. In February of 1993, a terrorist 
group, led my Ramzi Yousef, attempted to bring down the World Trade Center with a truck 
bomb resulting in 6 deaths and a thousand wounded. Terrorists’ bombings and threats on 
Americans have also occurred outside of the U.S. In November of 1995, five Americans were 
killed in a car bomb explosion that occurred outside the office of the United States program 
manager for the Saudi National Guard in Riyadh. A truck bomb killed 19 United States 
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servicemen in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia in 1996. Additionally, bombings of U.S. embassies in 
Kenya and Tanzania occurred in 1998 and two years later, an al Qaeda team planted explosives 
in a motorboat in order to blow a hole in the side of a U.S. destroyer, killing 17 American sailors 
(Summary of Final Report, 2014).  
Pandemics. The pandemic spread of influenza viruses is typically characterized by a 
high attack rate and an increased level of mortality, namely in young adults. A rather prominent 
pandemic is the 2009 Swine Flu (H1N1) pandemic. Classified as Influenza A H1N1, this new 
strain of Influenza A virus caused a major outbreak of human infection in the USA and Mexico 
in April of 2009. The virus is typically transmitted by respiratory droplets and can be spread by 
the touch of hands. This particular strain has a higher level of transmissibility than other seasonal 
influenza strains. Throughout the 2009 pandemic, many people who were infected experienced 
fevers, cough, sore throat, fatigue, shortness of breath, headache, vomiting, and various other 
symptoms. For those who already had medical complications such as chronic respiratory 
diseases, immune suppression, neurological disorders, diabetes and obesity, however, they 
experienced additional symptoms including pneumonia and peripheral neuropathy. The first 
cases of influenza A H1N1 pandemic were identified in April of 2009 in the U.S. By August of 
2009, approximately one million people were infected in the U.S. alone (Al-Muharrmi, 2010). 
Preparedness and response efforts. These aforementioned incidents involving weapons 
of mass destruction, explosives, and pandemics lead to severe repercussions on society and 
public health. As advancements are made and the threats become greater, it is even more crucial 
to ensure that there are efficient and effective preparedness and response efforts to combat these 
growing threats.          
 Weapons of mass destruction. Diplomacy, threat reduction assistance, and export 
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controls are all measures that must be taken in order to prepare for threats involving weapons of 
mass destruction. Such measures assist in impeding other states and terrorist organizations from 
using such weapons to cause severe damage to the U.S. They also help to slow down their ability 
to obtain the necessary materials to develop weapons of mass destruction as well as increase 
their costs to access sensitive technologies and expertise. While it is essential to protect the U.S. 
from other states and terrorist organizations utilizing weapons of mass destruction on U.S. soil, it 
is also important to support allies and the international community. Working closely with like-
minded countries increases the United States’ ability to stop the spread of weapons of mass 
destruction and develop recycle and fuel treatment technologies that are more efficient, cleaner, 
and more proliferation-resistant. In order to improve the ability to gather accurate and timely 
knowledge on adversaries’ capabilities regarding these weapons of mass destruction, effective 
intelligence, surveillance, related technologies, and research on the evolving threats must be 
reinforced. Particular emphasis should be placed on intelligence collection and analysis on 
weapons of mass destruction, interaction among U.S. intelligence and law enforcement, and 
intelligence cooperation with allies (GPO, 2008). 
Explosives. Explosives are often acts of terrorism that include any chemical compound 
mixture, or device, used to detonate a bomb such as improvised explosive devices (IED’s). 
Combatting the use of explosives includes utilizing developing technologies and capabilities to 
detect, locate, and render the devices safe before they detonate. This includes enhancing training 
and education efforts for bomb technicians and law enforcement officials to recognize precursor 
chemicals and materials used to develop improvised explosives or incendiary mixtures. 
Psychological and behavioral sciences should also be used to analyze potential threats of an 
explosive attack. Similar to most threats, combatting the use of explosives requires significant 
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coordination among local, state, tribal, territorial, and federal governments as well as the private 
sector, including operators and owners of critical infrastructure. Strengthening these partnerships 
will enhance communication efforts regarding accurate and timely information sharing in the 
event of a potential attack by means of explosives (GPO, 2008). 
Pandemics. Because the spread of a pandemic can lead to massive suffering and 
potential deaths, negative economic impacts, and mass panic by society, preparing for such 
incidents is necessary. Preparedness must include means to ensure clear communication of all 
responsibilities to levels of government, public health officials, and society. This entails 
educating society about high-risk practices involving potential increases in virus transmissions. It 
is the responsibility of health and medical officials to disperse information and education 
regarding epidemic and pandemic illness. Surveillance and detection practices provide 
situational awareness to ensure early warnings and detection of an outbreak of a disease and 
possible pandemic. Should a pandemic occur, response and containment plans assist in 
mitigating the spread of the outbreak as well as social, economic, and health impacts. Vaccines 
and antivirals are essential countermeasures. There must be a sufficient amount of vaccines 
available to vaccinate individuals within a certain timeframe of the emergence of the virus as 
well as plans to prioritize high-risk populations. In addition to ensuring resources such as 
vaccines, it is important to rapidly recruit and deploy health, medical, and veterinary providers 
with the necessary skills to assist in these types of emergencies. Their assistance is vital as 
pandemics will often lead to medical surges that require a vast amount of personnel to attend to 
such victims. Finally, coordination among localities, states, public health officials, critical 
infrastructure entities, and the private sector is essential to enhance capabilities to detect a 
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potential pandemic, locate its origin, stop its spread, and mitigate the repercussions on society 
(Homeland Security Council, 2005).  
Fusion centers. Some commonalities among the aforementioned threats include the need 
for situational awareness, timely and accurate intelligence, and effective communication and 
collaboration among numerous agencies as multiple become involved in public health related 
incidents. Through information gathering and sharing practices with several partners, fusion 
centers provide these abilities and can help to assist in better preparedness and response practices 
including public health incidents.  
 Terrorist attacks. Weapons of mass destruction and explosives are threats that terrorists 
tend to utilize in order to instill fear in the public, inflict massive critical infrastructure damage, 
impact the economy, and cause mass casualties. In order to detect such terroristic threats, it is 
essential to develop timely and accurate intelligence, coordinate with local, state, and federal 
governments, as well as the private sector, and share information. Often nontraditional collectors 
of intelligence, such as the private sector and public safety, contribute to fusion centers by 
providing important crime-related information such as risk assessments and suspicious activity. 
Fusion centers, in return, combine such information with law enforcement to develop actionable 
intelligence. The centers continue to reevaluate existing data in context with new data in order to 
provide updates on patterns, trends, and potential threats. This supports their abilities to better 
anticipate, detect, prevent, monitor, and respond to terrorist activity. Fusion centers’ information 
collection on other criminal activities such as illegal drug operations, fraud, money laundering, 
or identity theft can also assist in detecting a nexus between such crimes and potential terrorist 
organizations. Leveraging such information and intelligence supports the rapid identification of 
trends and patterns that may reflect emerging terrorist threats (DOJ, 2006). Fusion centers also 
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support intelligence efforts to combat terrorist attacks by coordinating with joint terrorism task 
forces, or operational groups, led by the FBI, that leverage a variety of resources from partner 
agencies to investigate and disrupt terrorist threats (DOJ, 2008). 
Natural incidents. While originally developed to enhance collection, analysis, and 
information sharing practices to detect criminal and terrorist activity, fusion centers are 
expanding to include all hazards approaches. In 2008, the Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention developed a pilot program, BioPHusion, to test the operational capacity and potential 
implementation of a public health fusion center. BioPHusion was developed and tested in order 
to develop a network that allowed for alert verification and distribution by collecting, 
monitoring, and integrating disparate kinds of health information into actionable intelligence. 
Such measures were created to support public health and take precautions to detect potential 
health threats such as pandemics. Similar to other fusion centers, BioPHusion maintains 
situational awareness. It is also a source of public health information for use by other agencies, 
such as the Department of Homeland Security. Enhancing early detection and rapid response of 
potentially catastrophic infectious disease outbreaks, as well as other public health emergencies, 
requires the integration of information among local, state, tribal, territorial, and federal partners. 
As public health concerns, such as pandemics, emerge, it is important to develop ways to 
aggregate data, access such information, and share patterns and trends with partners involved in 
preparing and responding to potential pandemics. Public health fusion centers can ensure the 
integration and exchange of biosurveillance information and enhance current capabilities to 
gather and analyze such data. With this data and knowledge, fusion centers would be able to 
disseminate information to decision makers involved in studying, preparing for, and responding 
to pandemics (Khan, Fleischauer, Casani, & Groseclose, 2010).  
123 
INFORMATION SHARING: LOCAL FUSION CENTERS  
 
In order to develop national health security, it is necessary to develop intelligence and 
share information related to both human-caused and natural incidents. Building national health 
security requires building information sharing partnerships and leveraging one another’s 
resources. Because fusion centers are focal points for information sharing, they can be extremely 
beneficial to the understanding, analysis, and dissemination of threat data related to public 
health. Several reports regarding public health preparedness such as the National Preparedness 
Guidelines and the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act have continued to reinforce the 
importance of using developing information technology and information management to support 
quicker, large-scale, more effective, and higher-quality detection of, response to, and recovery 
from public health emergencies. Such practices can be developed and strengthened through the 
use of fusion centers, enhancing the quality and quantity of pertinent data from which to identify 
relevant threats (DOJ, 2011).  
Leadership Challenges of Public Health 
Because public health threats such as weapons of mass destruction, explosives, and 
pandemics require numerous personnel in preparation and response efforts, leadership can 
remain a challenge in public health scenarios. Personnel can range from law enforcement, public 
health officials, the private sector, and the public. Public health incidents require teamwork in 
order to prevent attacks, protect infrastructure and people, minimize damage, and expedite 
recovery (GPO, 2008). With so many different personnel involved in public health incidents with 
different roles and responsibilities, however, it can be difficult to manage such incidents and 
ensure effective response efforts.  
Within the varying agencies and sectors, leadership from the healthcare industry is key to 
an effective response. Whether an attack includes weapons of mass destruction or explosives or 
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the spread of a pandemic, public health personnel play a vital role in response efforts. Doctors, 
nurses, EMS personnel, and critical care physicians all assist in these incidents that often lead to 
surge capacity within hospitals where patients require immediate assistance. Leaders within 
different hospitals must also be linked to assist patient transfers and provide mutual aid 
(Department of Health and Human Services, n.d.).      
 Effective preparedness and response efforts demand an established leadership structure 
with clear organizational responsibilities. In order to organize roles and responsibilities, 
including leadership, it is crucial to develop a hospital incident command system (HICS) in the 
event of an emergency. HICS is a widely used emergency management system for health care 
facilities that provides a chain of command that can quickly mobilize. Identifying the appropriate 
individuals to make decisions is crucial in a fast-speed disaster that can stem from incidents such 
as weapons of mass destruction, explosives, and pandemics. HICS allows such personnel to 
ensure accountability of position functions, allow for a flexible response to certain emergencies, 
improve documentation of facility actions throughout the emergency, provide a common 
language to facilitate outside personnel assisting, effectively manage an incident, and develop 
response checklists for senior leadership. Most importantly, those maintaining leadership roles 
within the incident management system must be knowledgeable of operations of other hospitals 
and community disaster responses as well as be trained in effectively managing incidents that 
require collaboration among numerous personnel in public health and public safety (Department 
of Health and Human Services, n.d.).   
Conclusion  
 Impending public health threats such as weapons of mass destruction, explosives, and 
pandemics remain a serious concern for the United States. As these threats expand and grow, it is 
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crucial to develop and implement efficient preparedness and response efforts. Fusion centers, in 
particular, can be beneficial to preparedness and response practices for public health related 
incidents. Their abilities to provide situational awareness to a locality, develop sound and 
accurate intelligence, inform decisions based on developed information, and collaborate among 
numerous public safety partners makes them a valuable resource to public health officials. By 
collaborating and cooperating with fusion centers, public health officials can better detect, 
mitigate, and prevent public health related incidents.  
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Conclusion 
 After September 11th 2001, the need for better communication and information sharing 
practices among law enforcement partners became very evident (National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks, 2004). Recognizing a communication gap among law enforcement agencies, 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) developed 
several new fusion centers to serve a critical role in identifying, analyzing, and sharing emerging 
threat-related information among law enforcement partners (FBI, 2009).  
Today, fusion centers remain a valuable asset to local law enforcement agencies and 
homeland security personnel as they gather and analyze information, develop actionable 
intelligence, and share such intelligence with several partners (DHS, 2017c). Remaining in 
various urban areas, local fusion centers retain situational awareness allowing them to assist local 
law enforcement efforts as well as contribute to the national threat picture (DHS, 2017d). Their 
partnerships with numerous law enforcement agencies and homeland security personnel allow 
them to alleviate deconfliction problems, develop connections in investigations, and identify 
threats in an efficient and effective manner.  
 Because local fusion centers play a crucial role in supporting criminal and terrorist 
investigations, it is valuable to continue to enhance their information sharing practices. My two-
part strategy consisting of strengthening current partnerships among fusion center analysts, local 
law enforcement personnel, and local FBI joint terrorism task forces, and developing and 
implementing a standardized training program for intelligence analysts aims to strengthen 
communication among law enforcement and enhance analysis and dissemination of intelligence. 
Through the use of efficient managers, strategic planning and budgeting, policy development and 
analysis, and information technology protection, the aforementioned plans can be developed and 
127 
INFORMATION SHARING: LOCAL FUSION CENTERS  
 
implemented to strengthen communication and enhance uniformity of proficiencies and practices 
among all fusion centers. 
In implementing the plans to enhance information sharing among fusion centers, 
procedures are needed to not only generate the seamless exchange of information among law 
enforcement partners, but to ensure that such practices and procedures are guided by the 
Constitution and abide by international human rights. Developing such procedures reassures the 
public that in the process of enhancing information sharing practices among fusion centers, 
Americans’ individual liberties will remain protected. This also allows the public to provide 
greater support for fusion centers and recognize their value in protecting the community. 
 Not only have fusion centers had success in criminal and terrorist investigations (DHS, 
2015e), but they continue to expand their resources and capabilities in gathering information and 
developing intelligence to other areas of expertise as well. They have begun to expand their 
capabilities to an all-hazards approach focusing on developing partnerships with various 
disciplines including public health and emergency management (Harris, 2008). They also 
collaborate with the private sector to aid in reducing risks to the community (DHS, 2014). The 
expansion of fusion centers’ information sharing partners demonstrates their value in being able 
to assist the community in many ways and protect them from various threats and disasters. Not 
only have fusion centers continued to expand their connections with partners within the U.S., but 
they have also developed connections with law enforcement in other countries. As seen with one 
of America’s allies in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia seems to be moving in the direction of 
developing similar information sharing centers as they have already established “fusion cells” 
where various partners, including Saudi Arabian intelligence officials and U.S. law enforcement 
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personnel, can work together to investigate and interdict terrorism plots (Saudi Arabia & 
Counterterrorism April, 2017). 
As criminals and terrorists continue to find new ways to attack, fusion centers’ ability to 
remain at the forefront of information gathering and disseminating among agencies can assist in 
various forms of crimes. Cybercrimes, for example, continue to expand as advancements in 
technology and both the availability and access to information grow. Such newly emerging 
crimes can emanate from terrorists or nation states threating local communities and the security 
of the United States. Fusion centers’ situational awareness and contact with local law 
enforcement officials can greatly assist in detecting a potential threat to the community and 
subsequently responding to it. Furthermore, they can disseminate intelligence forewarning other 
centers, agencies, and law enforcement officials of the potential threats in a timely and efficient 
manner. It is this unique ability of recognizing various forms of threats, gathering and analyzing 
information, and disseminating intelligence among law enforcement partners that helps to 
influence rapid response efforts and prevent the threat.  
As new, greater threats continue to transpire, enhancing fusion centers’ information 
sharing capabilities becomes more and more important. Their situational awareness, partnerships 
with law enforcement personnel, and ability to gather, analyze, develop, and share actionable 
intelligence makes them invaluable in being able to protect communities. By continuing to 
improve information sharing among local fusion centers and leveraging their resources and 
capabilities to exchange information with several partners, fusion centers can better identify, 
mitigate, and prevent threats impacting public safety and the security of the country. 
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